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LAST ISSUE

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-164
Thursday
22 August 1996

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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-164

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Albania: 'Strong Debate' Reported at PS Committee Meeting

AU2108141096 Tirana ATA in English
1310 GMT 21 Aug 96

[Report by A. Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 20 (ATA)—Amendments to the Socialist Party (PS) statute on the way the party's secretary general will be elected have given rise to a strong debate in Tuesday's [20 August] meeting of the PS General Leading Committee (KPD).

"Fatos Nano, (the imprisoned PS leader), will not be able to lead the party if he is reelected chairman, while in jail," said a member of the KPD.

The meeting discussed the most important documents which will be presented to the congress: a political report, a report of programme amendments, and a report for statute amendments.

The report had scrapped the PS chairman resignation, who is in jail for corruption and falsification of documents and abuse of office, but hailed the role of his motion and messages which "revived the debate inside the party."

The PS Presidency has rejected in a previous meeting Nano's motion which has caused a split inside the PS.

Namik Dokle, the PS deputy chairman, said "we approved to part, once and forever, from Marx's references as a theoretical source and the demagogy of the dictatorial system of Enver Hoxha and Ramiz Alia."

PS has been hardly attacked by the media and the right wing parties for the presence of Marx in its programme and for failing to criticise the communist dictatorship.

Asked by journalists if another report (prepared by Nano) would be presented to the congress, Dokle said: "Every other document cannot be called a report of the PSKPD."

He also said that "the second phase will have not many new delegates."

Albania: PS Member Urges Renewal Among Party 'Elite'

AU2108144196 Tirana ATA in English
1246 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 21 (ATA)—Some Socialist Party (PS) leaders should be excluded from its leadership, said Tuesday Dritero Agolli, a well-known writer and influential member of the PS Leading Committee after a meeting of this committee. The meeting discussed about the report of the PS Presidency

which will be presented in the second stage of the second PS Congress.

"If the PS wants to be a European party, its intellectual elite should be renovated with new ideas and then lead the party and the masses. This is very difficult on our conditions, because intolerance as a mentality of the past is present and we could not triumph over ourselves," said Agolli.

Agolli has always cherished the idea of an inside reformation of the PS. He declared to the tenth PLA [Party of Labor of Albania] congress delegates where it changed its name into PS that "they would never change."

Albania: PS Congress, Local Elections Viewed

AU2208085496 Tirana POLI I QENDRES
in Albanian 21 Aug 96 p 4

[Unattributed interview with Agim Nesho, executive director of the Foundation for Albania's Relations With Europe; place and date not given: "Albania, a Shameful Precedent in the Eyes of the West"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [POLI I QENDRES] About three months have now passed since 26 May. In hindsight, what were the conditions that led to the mass rigging of votes in the elections that should have brought the opposition parties to power?

[Nesho] After the defeat of the referendum of 6 November 1994, many foreign analysts saw the popular vote as a political protest against the form of government up until then. The defeat of the Democratic Party (PD) was not merely a consequence of dissatisfaction at social policy and the rate of the reform, but because of the mistakes of incompetent government that created the idea of a new administration that was neocommunist in its mentality, within the compromised economic and legal framework of a market economy. The exercise of control over the different branches of powers, the total dependence of the judicial system on politics, corruption, and the policies of nepotism and clan interests very quickly reminded the Albanians of the past. It seemed that Berisha and the PD were finished, but Berisha's skill and the inability of the Socialists to grasp the political moment enabled the government to consolidate itself again very quickly. Seizing the initiative within the country, Berisha at this time also played the international card and resorted to two basic arguments: First, he cited the failure of the largest opposition party, the Socialist Party (PS), to reform itself and mentioned a few names from the past, although it was well known that the PS also included distinguished intellectuals with fresh ideas; second, he also played the card of stability

in the Balkans and the possibility that any assumption of power by the Socialists could destabilize the situation, especially in Macedonia. For this purpose, the argument of the nationalist tendencies of the former communist parties of the East was used. The West, although following with concern the political situation in Albania and the course of democratic development, preferred to remain silent or to support Berisha for several reasons. First, Berisha and the PD were the symbols of the anticommunist opposition movement in Albania and, and the failure of their government could remove them definitively from play. There was, therefore, a need for a new balance of forces in Albanian political life. Second, there was a fear of a nationalist policy resulting from the opposition's ascent to power, without clear guarantees of its programs and its personalities. Unfortunately, F. Nano was in prison and the other opposition parties had relatively small electorates. Third, as it saw the Balkans torn by nationalisms and with its democracies still unconsolidated, Western political circles had shown that they preferred the safety of a strong leader rather than an assortment of groups and individuals. Aware of this attitude, Berisha had long ago worked to eliminate any alternative to his person. Nano, no doubt the brain of the PS, was in prison. Ceka, Imami, and Pashko, who were cofounders of the Democratic Party, and other leaders such as Kalakulla, had succeeded in creating independent personalities and had gained popularity. Berisha, aware of their support, worked very cleverly to create "lobbies" and backing from many individuals and personalities in world politics and diplomacy, who were interested in gaining something, or who simply came for a tourist visit, and who subsequently massaged public opinion over the need for a PD electoral victory. Frightened by fables about the return of communism and the political vindictiveness that would influence the economic reform, and swept away by feverish propaganda that displayed their own alternative as best for Albania, the converted former communists of the PD succeeded in hiding their sins and devised 26 May, a day which they planned would be silently accepted as a fait accompli for the sake of preserving stability in the Balkans and especially in Kosovo. The date of 26 May is and will remain a key moment in Albanian politics. Without dwelling on it, analyzing it, and reflecting on it, no political movement is of any value for politics and democracy in Albania.

[POLI I QENDRES] Nevertheless, after 26 May, a different attitude was adopted toward Albania. What were the reasons that led Western policy toward Tirana to crystallize in this way?

[Nesho] Of course, the fatal mistake that tore away the mask was rigging the voting and the shameless greed

that sections of the state openly displayed by violating the people's right to a free vote. The violence used against leaders of the opposition and the hoodwinked electorate also meant that the OSCE's foreign observers felt the tension caused by the vote-rigging on election day. Fortunately, these shocking events were faithfully and strongly reflected by the foreign and the Albanian press, sensitizing the Albanian and foreign public to what was happening in the country. The Albanian Government was not only failing to respect the principles of democracy, but was creating a bad precedent for all the other countries of Central and East Europe that were soon to hold elections too. The trend was evident in Croatia and was pushed beyond all limits in Albania, while there was a determination to keep the situation under control in Macedonia. This shameful precedent was to face the West with the dilemma of either defending the principles of democracy as a basic element of political philosophy or supporting an authoritarian regime that lacked popular support, but which had so far proved able to meet the West's demands of maintaining stability in the Balkans. This dangerous precedent and the leap "beyond the bounds of fairness" in the democratic game seems to have irreversibly reduced the credibility of the political class running Albania and eroded trust in their partnership for the future. The West is calling a halt to this trend in Albania.

[POLI I QENDRES] How do you see the local elections being held and the future course of the political crisis in Albania? Do you think that the opposition will agree to enter the elections on the present terms?

[Nesho] Albania is undergoing a real political crisis today. The inability of its rulers to reflect on the great crime of 26 May shows that it will not be easy to find a new path toward stability. It appears to Berisha and the PD that they have little room for maneuver, and it appears to me that their option is confined to carrying out the local elections at all costs. These local elections might have two outcomes, first an involvement of the opposition in the polls leading to a victory by the PD in the evident climate of force majeure and conformism. This would be a strong indicator to international institutions that the victory of 26 May was to some degree justifiable. Otherwise, a narrow victory for the opposition would be all that the government could tolerate, and it would lead them to claim that equilibrium has been restored and that they had reflected on 26 May.

On the international plane, we have been making efforts to portray ourselves as protagonists in the matter of establishing stability in the Balkans and keeping a balance on the Albanian question. It appears that in the present situation this opportunity has disappeared. The

peace process in Bosnia and the direct talks between Kosovo and Serbia have left Berisha and Albania on the sidelines.

For the opposition, the problem is broader, and requires more wisdom. First, the opposition is seeking to take part in the local elections on the condition that all its demands are met, without concessions, which means with legal guarantees. The aim is not only to win the administrative elections: These elections are primarily a test of whether to return to 26 May. If the opposition enters the election, one condition must be a respect for the scheme proposed by the State Department and the institutions of Europe. With the card of 26 May in its hand, the opposition controls the political game. It has great opportunities, but the reality is harsh. Any failure by the opposition to enter the elections, accompanied by strong arguments that the rules are not being respected, will oblige Berisha and the PD to take further steps deeper into illegitimacy, and will doubtless provoke greater criticism from the West, which might react with even tighter measures. The game is in the opposition's hands. It holds the card of 26 May.

[POLI I QENDRES] The Socialists appear to be undergoing the most painful experiences in their history, reform of the party leadership. What is your opinion of the current debate on this topic? What do you think of Nano's initiative?

[Nesho] The PS Congress is no doubt taking place at a key moment in our country's political life. The entire Albanian political spectrum is waiting for the proceedings of the congress with interest. The PD itself is interested, at this moment without hope for itself, in seeing a split between those who are "renewed" (according to its own definition, and for whom it reserves special programs on television), and the remainder of the party, to perhaps realize after the congress the favorite scenario of the "Laco parties" [contemptuous term referring to Social-Democratic Union Chairman Teodor Laco, used by Socialist Party Chairman Nano for parties that have accepted the 26 May elections]. For Berisha, a failure to approve Nano's motion would be the greatest possible victory, "appeasing" the West and possibly modifying the West's plans, on the basis of the idea that this party cannot offer any new alternative. The congress will essentially carry out the renewal of the party, something that everybody wants. Narrow personal interests will clash with the interests of the electorate. Conformism and stagnation will be up against a movement for victory. F. Nano's motion has come to the aid of the party at this moment, to rescue and guide it. Fatos Nano is doubtless the most complete and intellectual personality in the PS, who deserves the main credit for the reform and the alternative this party offers. Because he is also

an alternative figure of power, Berisha, not without regret, keeps him in prison, drawing down on himself the attacks of the civilized West for the sake of holding the opposition leader hostage in a cell. Because he is a cultured man and an intellectual recognized internationally (the highest circles in the West and in the United States call him the Kwasniewski of Albania), his alternative, that is his motion, is the only movement that can bring a victory to the Socialist electorate.

His movement, which doubtless preserves and defends the interests of the Socialist electorate and is preparing the electorate for the assumption of power by the PS, is unfortunately being understood narrowly and in terms of personal interests by some people who in the name of unity are trying to preserve the status quo and to enable Berisha to keep the initiative in his hands just as he has done for the last four years. However, can the interests of the electorate be sacrificed for the sake of certain people who call themselves indispensable? What alternative and what idea have these people prepared in the last four years besides preserving the party under the banner of its persecuted chairman? How often have democratic alternatives been used to struggle against rising prices, violence and crime, botched privatization, the approval of unconstitutional laws, and the failures of government, and to strive for the release of the imprisoned chairman? What have these people done but to sit in comfortable offices and wait to win the elections as a result of popular protest? This unity now looks like unity in the defense of privileges and jobs, not unity for victory and around Nano. Any attempt to sabotage the motion even to the slightest extent will cost the PS dearly and any compromise scheme will damage it on its path toward putting forward an alternative form of government. This is in my view the way in which Nano's motion has multiple meanings.

Albania: FM Shehu Hails Opening of UNFPA Office

*AU2108142896 Tirana ATA in English
1305 GMT 21 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 21 (ATA)—Albanian Foreign Minister Tritan Shehu received the UNDP [United Nations Development Program] Representative Peter Schuman, who introduced permanent Representative of UNFPA (United Nations Fund for Population Activity), Dr. Sieben, on the occasion of opening of an office of this fund in Tirana, said Foreign Ministry spokesman Gilbert Galanxhi.

"The cooperation with Albanian Government will be very efficacious during the four years to come, because a completed legislation already exists in Albania," pointed out Dr. Sieben.

Shehu, after thanking him for the cooperation with the UNDP, stressed the fact that the opening of an UNFPA office in Tirana (because its activity will also cover other countries in the region), is an estimation for Albania which has successfully surpassed the 50-year communist self-isolation, and gives a priority to the structures of the UN.

Albania: Daily Publishes Jail Photo of Nano With 2 Killers

AU2108141296 Tirana ATA in English
1304 GMT 21 Aug 96

[Report by J. Zaloshnja]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 21 (ATA)—Newspaper ALBANIA carries today on its first page, a photo of the Socialist Party (PS) leader Fatos Nano (im-

prisoned for corruption and falsification of documents) with super killer Nehat Kulla and another killer F.K. sentenced 25 years in prison.

The photo, where the three are shoulder to shoulder, was taken some time ago in Tirana jail where all the three were suffering their punishment, says ALBANIA.

Their relations were deconspired [as received] during the last election campaign when Kulla exercised pressure on the electorate to vote for the PS, concludes the paper.

Nehat Kulla is hunted down by the police for killing on August 12, two brothers, policemen, Besim and Gezim Neziri while patrolling in a quarter on the outskirts of Tirana.

Bulgaria: DPS Claims Greece Objects to Makaza Pass

AU2208104896 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
22 Aug 96 p 2

[Staff report: "Greece Refuses Makaza Project?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 21 August in Khaskovo, Yudzhel Atila, parliamentary faction spokesman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS], said: "After the recent developments in relations between Greece and Turkey the hopes related to opening the Makaza Pass are evaporating. Last night, Turkish television carried a report on actions of Greek nationalists in the town of Komotini, about 15 km from the pass. Houses and shops of Bulgarian and Turkish speaking Muslims in the town have been attacked. Athens will not allow the opening of a 'Muslim swell [val]' and the development of an economic revival in the region as a result of opening the road through the Rhodopes Mountains. Our current leaders also do not want a growth in cities in which there are DPS mayors."

Because of economic and political considerations, Athens reportedly is doing everything possible to foil the opening of a border checkpoint at the Makaza Pass and moving the road by about 100 meters to the east. This is the conclusion of Remzi Osman, chief expert to Dogan [DPS leader] on transportation issues. According to Greece transportation corridor No. 9 should pass not through Makaza, but rather through Svilengrad toward Alexandroupolis, Osman told NOV ZHIVOT. According to him, the claims of the Greek Government that roads are actively being constructed between Gyumyurdzhina and Makaza, are a bluff. Losing the Makaza Pass dooms the DPS voters to hunger, and this is a sufficient reason for Dogan's people to begin an attack against Videnov's cabinet, sources at the DPS Kurdzhali Okrug Council claim.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Delays Approving Senior Military Posts

AU2208103596 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian
22 Aug 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Eleven Officers Remain Without President Zhelev's Signature"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 11 generals and colonels have not received their appointment decrees from President Zhelev.

Generals Lilyan Dinkov, Angel Marin, Angel Katsarov, and Kiril Ermenkov, who were supposed to assume various posts in the Army Inspectorate, remain without the appropriate presidential decree. General Kiril Vasilev,

who was supposed to become chief of the office [as published], General Angel Angelov, who was supposed to become chief of the Military Academy, General Lyuben Pandev, who was supposed to become chief of the Ministry of Defense Personnel Department, and Rear Admiral Mincho Bakalov, supposed to become chief Navy inspector, also remain without a decree and continue to wait for the president's approval.

Sources at No. 2 Dondukov Street [the Presidency], explained that their appointments are not urgent and can wait until Zhelev returns from Grozden.

Six decrees, whereby Zhelev appointed 18 generals and colonels to new posts, were released for publication in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK on 21 August.

General Stefan Nikolov is to command the Army 2d Corps, while General Ivan Dobrev becomes deputy commander of the 1st Corps. General Tsanko Dolenski, hitherto the deputy commander of the 1st Army, has been appointed Military Police chief. General Petko Dragoev becomes deputy chief of the Ground Troops Staff. Colonel Yanko Yanev is to command the 17th Motor Rifle Division. Captain First Class Petur Petrov has been appointed deputy chief of the Navy Main Staff.

Bulgaria: Electric Company To Fund Nuclear Fuel Purchase

AU2208102596 Sofia STANDART NEWS
in Bulgarian 22 Aug 96 p 13

[Staff report: "National Electricity Company Finds \$5 Million for Nuclear Fuel, Pays Moscow Tomorrow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Electricity Company has succeeded in ensuring \$5 million for the purchase of nuclear fuel for Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant reactor No. 6, PRESS AGENCY BALKAN reported on 21 August. The payment must be made by 23 August.

This is only a part of what is needed to supply the plant with fuel. Some \$32 million are needed for normally refueling the plant, Kiril Nikolov, director of Kozloduy Plant said. So far Bulgaria has paid \$12 million. The other \$20 million will be paid by the end of the year, he said.

Yesterday it was reported that reactor No. 6 of Kozloduy Nuclear Plant would stop temporarily on 23 August for refueling. The chiefs of the State Research and Development Foundation are meeting today to discuss the guarantees for a credit of about 10 million leva for the National Electricity Company. The company will have to find alone a credit institution to allocate the amount.

Czech Republic: Government Approves Amended Nuclear Bill

LD2108150296 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government today approved the so-called nuclear bill. Ondrej Kopa has more details:

[Kopa] The most controversial clause of this bill was the passage about an absolute ban on any handling of nuclear weapons on our territory. According to [Prime Minister] Vaclav Klaus, the government has merely provided an addendum to the bill, allowing for an exception if an international treaty is concluded. This wording allegedly no longer prevents our possible membership in NATO. The Czech prime minister added, however, that a conclusion of such a treaty has to be approved by parliament and this, in his view, should appease our public. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Ministries Still Considering MiG Modernization

AU2108143996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 21 Aug 96 p 2

[Report by "gag": "The Possibility of Modernizing Russian MiG's Has Not Yet Been Completely Eliminated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Regardless of the culminating struggle between the Western arms manufacturers over the contract to supply fighter jets, representatives of the Industry and Defense Ministries are again beginning to talk about the modernization of the Rus-

sian MiG-21 fighters. At the same time, it is the step that was abandoned by former Defense Minister Vilem Holan under pressure from the parliament last year, and it seemed to have been the definite end of the antiquated Russian machines.

"Only the modernization of MiG's corresponds to the financial possibilities of the Army budget," Deputy Defense Minister Miroslav Kalousek claims. Other offers for the refurbishment of the languishing Air Force are, according to him, so costly that it would double military spending. Hence, the Army would have to receive 60 billion korunas instead of the current 30 billion, and Deputy Finance Minister Miroslav Havel earlier described this sum as unrealistic.

According to Jaroslav Borak, director general at the Industry Ministry, if the government released the funds for the purchase of new machines, it should be assured, after all, that the purchased aircraft are assembled in the Republic. The domestic arms manufacturers could also participate in the production of the hydraulic systems or fuselage.

As opposed to Kalousek and some industry representatives, soldiers unequivocally prefer the possibility of purchasing the modern Western machines. "Because of the low operation costs and high combat value, I consider the multipurpose fighter F/A-18 an ideal craft for the Air Force," General Ladislav Klima, Tactical Air Force commander, said. The present chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security, Petr Necas, sees the purchase of the Western fighters as the only solution.

Slovakia: PRC General on Slovakia's Integration With West

*LD2108213496 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 2000 GMT 21 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovakia's integration into the North Atlantic alliance is in the interests of stability and peace in Central Europe. This was stressed by Wang Ke, quartermaster general of the Chinese Army, during his meeting in Bratislava today with Jozef Gajdos, state secretary at the Ministry of Defense. In this connection, he also said that the Chinese armed forces are defensive in character and that Beijing has no interest in pursuing a policy of expansionism.

Jozef Gajdos appreciated China's initiative concerning the issue of a general ban on nuclear weapons and briefed his guest on the transformation process in our army.

Slovakia: Nationalists' 'Ruinous' Sway Over Diplomacy Viewed

*AU2108145196 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak
21 Aug 96 p 5*

[Commentary by Ivan Ceredjejev: "Diplomatic Briefcases in the Hands of the Wrong People; Bratislava's Gromyko-Style Diplomacy in Relation to Budapest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is perhaps unnecessary to emphasize how vitally important it is for Slovakia's foreign policy interests to keep the country in the game for NATO and EU membership, and that correct relations with one's neighbors figure very high on the list of the most fundamental conditions for membership. The prime minister will perhaps remember the expressions of international recognition that were accorded to him after his exchange of fountain pens with Horn over the freshly signed Slovak-Hungarian Treaty in March 1995. Today, one and a half years later, it is evident that this diplomatic success remained isolated and ignominiously unutilized. The treaty has not become what it was supposed to become and what is laid down in its title. After the postponement of the meeting between Prime Ministers Meciar and Horn, not even optimists dare speak about the development of goodneighborly relations between Bratislava and Budapest. The most recent "activities" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that Slovak foreign policy has found itself in the tow of particular interests that stir the domestic political scene. Alas, from the viewpoint of the country's presentation abroad and the assertion of its strategic interests, these interests are completely undesirable. In this case it is, above all, the extreme nationalism of a narrow group of people whom the prime minister, during his last ascent to the political limelight, towed along as his coalition

partner. How is one to assess the nonattendance of the reception given by the Hungarian Embassy in Bratislava on the occasion of the National Day of the Hungarian Republic? If not the minister [of foreign affairs], who was nominated to his post by a political party, then at least the state secretary (not to mention the prime minister and other cabinet members), who does have some experience in the field, should have realized that this style of foreign policy ceased being practiced a long time ago, with the possible exception of Cuba in relation to the United States. I suppose that not even the Soviet advisers of the Gromyko era would have recommended such an unnecessarily deliberate faux pas.

The diplomatic trade is one that directly pertains to the much-touted building of the country's positive image. And every textbook of diplomacy says right on page one that the best-tryed and simplest means of diplomacy is direct contact, which no statement laboriously formulated in a ministerial office can supplant. It is literally tragic that Slovak diplomacy is not able to so much as weaken the ruinous influence of Slovak or Hungarian nationalists on Slovakia's international reputation, although, within the political spectrum of the state, these groups undeniably represent a tiny minority. Nothing illustrates this misery better than the latest statement of the Slovak National Party [SNS], which did not shrink from attacking the president because of his participation in the above reception, in the endeavor to ingratiate itself with its voters, for whose heart, wounded by the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, the beerhall talk about blood-thirsty Huns is like a soothing balm... What a lesson on how to build relations with Hungary Romania is teaching our "diplomats" these days! Following patient talks, Romania succeeded in making Budapest give up the demand that a reference to the collective rights of the Hungarian minority and to ethnic autonomy be included in the text of the bilateral treaty being prepared! The negative reactions from abroad to Budapest's scarcely concealed endeavor to expand its influence beyond its borders, as in the days of pre-1918 Hungary, indicate where the weakness of Hungarian foreign policy lies. But is it reasonable to expect that these weaknesses will be exploited for Slovakia's benefit by diplomats steeled in the atmosphere of public rallies and party conferences, by a strange mixture of cadres with dark past and bright future whose greatest merit is that they can read in the eyes of those in power more than an ordinary mortal?

Slovakia: Lack of 'Peripheral Vision' Within SNS Criticized*AU2108133596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Aug 96 p 4*

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Slota's Poor Peripheral Vision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most recent statement by Slovak National Party [SNS] leader Jan Slota referring to President Michal Kovac and his participation in a reception held to mark the Hungarian national holiday again confirms that certain circles in Slovakia are still trying to make political capital with the aid of the Hungarian bogeyman. This is almost too strikingly reminiscent of the situation in the Balkans or on post-Soviet territory five years ago when strong words were later replaced by gunfire.

Playing the Hungarian card as an attempt to demonstrate the inevitability of its political existence would not be anything extraordinary if the SNS were not part of a ruling coalition that, among other things, has improving relations with its neighbors—that is, with Hungary, too—in its program. At the same time, the government in Budapest, with whose prime minister the Slovak prime minister signed a basic treaty for whose ratification the SNS deputies also raised their hands, is really trying—although, with certain excesses and errors—to formulate the kind of policy that, in the case of its predecessors, they could not even dream of in neighboring countries.

The fact that the president attended a celebration to mark the Hungarian national holiday is a common diplomatic custom. The accusation that, by doing so, he has endorsed the rampaging of the present-day Hungarians' ancestors during their conquest of the Carpathian basin is, to say the least, an effrontery, if not something worse.

If we were to take things only from a strictly historical point of view, then none of our public officials should take part in celebrating the holidays of the imperialist, but also other countries, regardless of their geographic location, because each of them has its own not exactly clean history. By the way, this also applies to the forebears of the current inhabitants of Slovakia, who also did not occupy this territory by merely winning over the original tribes.

However, we would not have made our way anywhere like this. And if we had, then it would have been onto the periphery of political events where Slovakia would not have to be at all visible, although many gung-ho patriots are calling eagerly for its increased visibility. But, as in sport, in politics it is also necessary to have well-developed peripheral vision. Either a person has

this, or not. It is possible to attain this only partially and it may break down at the most important moment.

It seems that this also applies to many coalition politicians, who are confusing strategy with tactics.

Slovakia: Daily Analyzes Postponement of Meciar-Horn Talk*AU2208123396 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Aug 96 p 4*

[Commentary by Milan Stanislav: "A State Does Not Choose Its Neighbors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the fact that more than a week has passed since the telephone postponement of the meeting between Prime Ministers Vladimir Meciar and Gyula Horn, only now is the background to this step assuming more discernible contours. At the same time, it is certainly no coincidence that the telephone call was preceded by coalition talks.

Following the Calvary with the ratification process for the basic interstate treaty with Hungary, Prime Minister Meciar again finds himself virtually at the start of the task of improving neighborly relations. It goes without saying that a key role has been played by the Hungarian-Hungarian conference in Budapest. A meeting with Prime Minister Horn—by the way, the personal relations between the two prime ministers are better than the relations between their countries—could provide the scope for a discussion on the contentious points contained in the declaration issued by the conference. It seems, however, that the prime minister will have to fight the decisive battle at home with his coalition partners and also in his own movement. Namely, in establishing Slovak statehood, the prime minister frequently played the national card. This gave encouragement to some of his fellow travelers, for whom playing the national card was the alpha and omega of their political activity. The repercussions were not long in coming. For example, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Deputy Viliam Hornacek circulated a document in parliament against the ratification of the treaty that had been signed by the chairman of his movement. Other deputies from this movement also spoke out strongly against the treaty. Roman Hofbauer relentlessly publishes his vision of the Hungarian threat to our sovereignty. In turn, HZDS Deputy Zora Lazarova and another coalition politician, Jozef Prokes, threw roses into the Danube as "a commemoration devoted to the victims of the incursion by ancient Magyar nomads into Central Europe." In the HZDS statement on the 28th anniversary of the occupation, it mentions first the invasion by Hungarian troops, although it is known that Janos Kadar was not among the initiators of the invasion. Is this by

accident or design? That is, the aforementioned acts do not contribute at all to improving neighborly relations. They are more reminiscent of the situation prior to the start of the military conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the bloodiest in recent years. We surely do not want this. A state cannot choose its neighbors. It simply has to learn to live with the ones it has.

So, Vladimir Meciar is not in a very enviable position. However, it is necessary to believe that, in the interest of all of us, he will manage to cope with the situation. Incidentally, in one of his interviews, Sergej Kozlik also admitted that he admires Meciar's ability to achieve his objective obliquely.

Slovakia: 'Privatization Activities' of HZDS's Matejka

AU2108134096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Aug 96 p 1-2

[Article by "(rzi, pt)": "The Privatization Activities of HZDS Deputy Chairman Matejka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In connection with privatization, a number of reports have reached the public about the widespread economic activities of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] district functionaries in West Slovakia. This involves, in particular, HZDS Deputy Chairman and NR SR [National Council of the Slovak Republic] Deputy Arpad Matejka, Vladimir Poor, former chairman of the HZDS District Board in Trnava, and Milan Rehak, chairman of the HZDS District Board in Trencin and vice president of the National Property Fund [FNM]. SME has managed to ascertain that HZDS Deputy Chairman A. Matejka is involved in the privatization process on behalf of his children. His son Robert Matejka is a co-owner of BAMAX Ltd. Trnava (ICO [Identification Number] 31436943), which deals wholesale in medical products, and also a co-owner, along with V. Poor, of Biotechnologicka Spolocnost [Biotechnological Company] Ltd. Bratislava (ICO 31406475), which is involved in purchasing starch-bearing raw materials and selling fodder. In the case of Biotechnologicka Spolocnost, the HZDS deputy chairman is involved in the privatization of the Slovenske Sladovny [Slovak Malt-Houses] State Enterprise [s.p.] Trnava (ICO 00155551), from which the K&K Company (ICO 31577601)—breweries belonging to HZDS Deputy Karol Konarik—has been excluded.

A. Matejka's daughter, Katarina Janosikova (nee Matejkova), is an associate in the Oran Ltd. Trnava (ICO 34129081) and Beryl Ltd. Trnava (ICO 34129685) companies, which are involved in mediation. We have found out from the FNM that A. Matejka and FNM Vice President M. Rehak, along with HZDS Deputies S. Lisko, A.

Tarnoczy, K. Zahatlan, V. Vicen, and others direct and mediate the expedition of privatization projects for those interested in privatization. A. Matejka is also involved in planning joint activities for the Tatrasklo s.p. (ICO 00213578), ZOS Trade Ltd. (ICO 34118454), and ZOS Trnava a.s. [shareholding company] (ICO 34108513) companies.

Slovakia: Carnogursky Insists on 'Politically Neutral' Army

AU2108162596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Aug 96 p 4

[Article by Christian Democratic Movement Chairman Jan Carnogursky: "Problems of the Slovak Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three and half years after its inception, the Slovak Army is winning public opinion surveys and, occasionally, also international competitions for smaller units, and, at the same time, its search for its image is still underway. In proportion to its population, Slovakia has a larger army than the neighboring states. In comparison with Germany, it is even twice as large. International treaties on the strength of the army allow Slovakia to maintain an army of approximately 46,000 men, and Slovakia has such an army. Nevertheless, it does not have the funds to maintain an army as large as this. This year, 13.6 billion korunas [Sk] from the budget has been designated for the army, which is 7.2 percent of the entire state budget. This money suffices for a so-so maintenance of the army, but not for any purchase of new equipment, or even repairs to the old equipment. It is not enough for a sufficient training of the reserves, and it is not enough for the construction of new facilities. There will be no more money for the army in the coming budgets either, while the present financing could maintain an army of 35,000. This basic discrepancy in the preparation of the army can be solved by either the government or the ministry. All the weapons systems came from the federal army, and their lifespan is slowly being exhausted. Only new aircraft are being bought from Russia from the unfrozen debts. The operation of these aircraft is very costly, as are the spare parts. No one asks what will happen with the new aircraft after the unfrozen debts are exhausted.

The army does not manage the funds it receives very well. Various additional and staff units comprise too great a proportion of the total, and the combat units form too small a proportion. Foreign armies have as much as 50 percent more combat units in relation to the total complement than Slovakia. In Slovakia, the Defense Ministry and the General Staff grew to fantastic dimensions, and deal with the same matters. Some departments at the ministry and in the General Staff are

identical. They compete, although just one department, say, at the General Staff, would suffice, and the Defense Ministry could finally deal with building the army. The depreciation of materiel continues, and if the army does not make radical repairs, then the equipment and the arms will gradually fail. This will necessarily lead to an increase in fatal injuries. Our army uses five types of combat aircraft, which renders their operation much more expensive. Comparable armies in western Europe use two, or at the most three types of aircraft. The combat hardware is failing to the point that there is not enough usable hardware for training the troops. It is not uncommon for the troops to use two tanks in exercises instead of seven or eight because only two are in working condition.

The training of the reserves has not taken place since 1990, while the reserves should undergo training every three or four years. If the reserves are not trained, the value of the entire army declines. This year, a symbolic number of reserve troops underwent training, but that is far from enough to maintain the skills of these troops.

The army should be politically neutral, and discipline can be maintained only if it is. Nevertheless, the government coalition draws the army into its dirty maneuvers. Defense Ministry State Secretary Josef Gajdos publicly appealed to the president of the republic to resign. In any normal army, such an attack on the commander in chief of the army would result in an immediate dismissal. In Slovakia, it is a condition for a brilliant career. How can such a command demand discipline from the troops? There is a conflict between the defense minister and the ministry's state secretary that divides the ministry. The soldiers, NCOs, and officers have built a small but ambitious Slovak army from the chaos of the division of the federal army. If they had a free hand, the army would be able to defend the Slovak territory in the instance of a local conflict. Nevertheless, the army must be protected against being dragged into the political intrigues of the present coalition.

Hungary: Kovacs Ready To Sign Treaty With Romania

LD2108151896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Government is prepared to sign the basic treaty with Romania as early as September, although the date has not been set yet, said [Hungarian Foreign Minister] Laszlo Kovacs at his press briefing this afternoon. The "Chronicle" [this program] was represented by Istvan Kulcsar.

[Kulcsar] The foreign minister announced that there were two unresolved issues in the draft basic treaty: compensation for church assets and the name of the body that will monitor the sides' adherence to the treaty. By the way, the issue of compensation could be settled in a document outside the scope of the basic treaty, said Kovacs.

To the question of whether there was full unity within the government regarding the basic treaty, the foreign minister answered with a yes, stressing that even the Alliance of Free Democrats' ministers had given their approval.

To the question of whether the government would sign the basic treaty even if the Hungarian opposition—the coalition of the ethnic Hungarian parties of Slovakia and the UDMR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania] were against it—Kovacs also replied in the affirmative. However, he pointed out that UDMR leaders were not against the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty but that they had simply voiced their concerns about it.

Hungary: Slovak, Romanian Hungarians Call for New Summit

AU2108135896 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 21 Aug 96 pp 1, 6

[Article by Ladislav Uhrin: "Will There Be a New Hungarian-Hungarian Summit in September?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Budapest—The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DZMR) [UDMR in Romanian] and representatives of the Hungarian Coalition [MK] in Slovakia consider it very important that a meeting similar to the "Hungary and Hungarians Living

Beyond the Borders" conference of July be convened in September of this year. This was stated following yesterday's talks in the Hungarian capital between DZMR and MK representatives, held in conjunction with their disagreement with the supplementary explanation contained in the [draft] Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty.

DZMR Chairman Bela Marko stressed that also the Hungarian minority in Romania considers it dangerous when the basic treaty contains an interpretation of Council of Europe Recommendation No. 1201 that does not recognize minorities' collective rights.

In the opinion of Miklos Duray, chairman of the [Slovak] Coexistence Movement, the Hungarian Government has found itself in opposition to the European Parliament. Duray said in this context: "Unfortunately, I have to warn, in the light of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty being drafted, that the already signed and ratified Slovak-Hungarian Treaty legitimizes all the negative steps taken in Slovakia prior to and after the implementation of the basic treaty."

Bela Marko from the DZMR said that, in the spirit of reconciliation, he is not going to polemicize over whether European integration is also in the interest of minorities. Precisely for this reason it is legitimate to ask what slows down genuine reconciliation between neighboring states? It is obvious that, when replying to this question, it is necessary to talk about the most important problem, that is, the minorities issue, about the fact that the problem of minorities has not been solved in Romania. According to Bela Marko, reconciliation is possible when this issue is solved. For this reason, the DZMR objects to the interpretation of Council of Europe Recommendation No. 1201 in the Romanian-Hungarian treaty.

Dissatisfaction was expressed also by Miklos Duray: "The Hungarian Government has not fulfilled its promises and for this reason because of the changed attitude of the Budapest government to Hungarian minorities, a new 'Hungary and Hungarians Living Abroad' meeting is warranted. Relations between the Hungarian Government and Hungarians living abroad have surprisingly deteriorated." [passage omitted]

B-H: OSCE Rules for Election Campaign Detailed
AU1608121496 Sarajevo ONASA in English
2315 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, August 15 (ONASA)—These campaign rules which have been approved by the Provisional Election Commission will apply the 1996 election to be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All registered political parties and candidates contesting these elections will abide by these rules and will take the necessary steps to ensure that these rules are well known and adhered to by their campaign workers.

1. Registered political parties and candidates shall not make use of the radio, television or newspaper media on polling day or on the day immediately before polling day, for the purposes of promoting or opposing a particular registered party or the election of a particular candidate.
2. All registered political parties and candidates must be granted by local public officials an equal opportunity to display posters and other campaign materials in public places.
3. The unlawful removal, cover up, mutilation, defacing or alteration of any printed advertisement, placard, poster or banner referring to a particular political party or the election of a particular candidate is strictly prohibited.
4. Registered political parties and candidates shall not make use of any broadcasting facility outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, after midnight on August 26, 1996, for the purposes of promoting or opposing a particular registered party or the election of a particular candidate.
5. It is strictly prohibited to make or publish any false statement in relation to a political party or to the personal character or conduct of a candidate.
6. The impersonation of a candidate or a campaign worker of a candidate or of a political party is strictly prohibited.
7. In relation to voting at the elections, no person may:
 - a) Induce a person to vote knowing that the person is not qualified to vote at the election;
 - b) Induce a person to apply for ballot papers to vote in the name of some other person or having voted once at the elections, apply at the same election for other ballot papers.
8. All registered parties and candidates will cooperate in so far as possible, to avoid arrangements involving public meetings, rallies, or marches taking place at the

same time and the same place as similar political events organized by other parties or candidates.

9. No meeting, rally, march or other political event compromising 50 or more individuals may be held without notifying in writing at least 24 hours prior to the event the appropriate Local Election Commission and appropriate local police. Such events must not be disrupted by other political parties or by local authorities.

10. Any party or individual, who has reason to believe that a registered party or candidate in the election has committed a breach of these Campaign Rules, will have the right to lodge a complaint with the Election Appeals Sub-Commission which will have the power to impose appropriate penalties, ranging from fines to disqualification of individual candidates or of one or more of the candidates appearing on the party list. OSCE officials working on behalf of the Election Appeals Sub-Commission in an official investigation may remove or confiscate any promotional materials to the extent necessary in order to conduct investigations into violations of these rules.

B-H: Commission Establishes Ballot-Counting Rules
AU1608205796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1543 GMT 16 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 16 Aug (BETA)—The Provisional Electoral Commission (PIK) has established the last part of the electoral regulations—the way the ballot papers are to be counted and the way the results of the general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina set for 14 September 1996 will be established.

Sir Kenneth Scott, chairman of the Political Parties Consultative Council, announced in Sarajevo today that the final results of the upcoming elections will be announced on 20 September at the latest, "whereby all doubts about their regularity will be removed."

"According to the latest PIK regulations, which will be announced soon, the counting of the ballots will be carried out by local electoral commissions in the counting centers in every municipality, and will be controlled by international monitors," Scott explained. He added that elections will be first organized for refugees currently living in 54 countries between 28 August and 3 September.

Scott explained that all ballots from abroad will be brought to Sarajevo in special sacks and, together with ballots in envelopes that will be coming by mail, will be sorted according to the municipalities from which voters originate.

"Electoral regulations envisage that ballots in envelopes should not be opened, but only sorted in Sarajevo and, under the control of all parties, be distributed to municipalities where fixed local commissions will count them and send the results to six regional OSCE centers and then to Sarajevo where final results will be announced," Scott said.

According to these regulations, the votes for the three-member Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency will be the first to be counted at the municipal counting centers and the results will be publicized on 16 or 17 September.

Next to be counted will be votes for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly House of Representatives, followed by the votes for the House of Representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, as well as for the president and vice presidents of the Serb Republic (RS).

In the fourth stage, the results of the elections for deputies of the RS People's Assembly and representatives of 10 cantonal councils in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation are to be established.

Finally, votes are to be counted for municipal assemblies. There are 109 municipal assemblies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 49 of which are divided, which means that their local bodies will be elected in both the RS and Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

At the end, Sir Kenneth Scott expressed hope that the upcoming elections will be held in a democratic and fair atmosphere, and that possible manipulation of ballots will be reduced to the lowest possible degree.

B-H: Serb Parties Deny Being Invited To Appear on TV

*AU1708145396 Sarajevo NTV99 Television
in Serbo-Croatian 0730 GMT 16 Aug 96*

[Interview with representatives of the Serb Peasant Party, the Socialist Workers' Party, the People's Party of the Serb Republic, the Serb Party of Krajina, and Milenko Marinovic of the Serb Patriotic Party by an unidentified reporter in Sarajevo on 15 August—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Reporter] Tell us, why are you not using the promotional slots made available by Television Bosnia-Herzegovina to the parties from the Serb Republic?

[Unidentified Serb Peasant Party, SSS, representative] I am the chairwoman of the SSS and would be interested in coming to Bosnia-Herzegovina to present my party on television. We received an invitation one day before the slot for political party promotions in the 10-minute programs. We were unable to come then. I came a

day later by bus to Sarajevo, but it was not organized then. I asked the OSCE whether it would be possible to organize a recording then, but they said that it had not been planned. That is why nothing happened. Still, we are interested if there is a possibility to do it now.

[Reporter] Have you received an invitation from NTV99 to participate in their programs?

[SSS representative] We have not received any invitation from any Bosnia-Herzegovina studio apart from the official Television Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Unidentified Socialist Workers' Party, SRP, representative] We are only going to participate in the municipal elections in the Serb Republic, and that is why we have not used this opportunity. Otherwise there are no obstacles. Why not? I think that we should present our party on your television, since the Yugoslav SRP's program is interesting.

[Reporter] Have you received an invitation from independent television NTV99?

[SRP representative] No, unfortunately, we have not received anything.

[Unidentified People's Party of the Serb Republic, NSRS, representative] The parties from the Serb Republic, if they are willing to take part in Sarajevo independent television programs, have to register and meet their obligations to the city of Sarajevo and to Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not believe that they are well informed or that they know that they can appear on state television.

[Reporter] Have you received an invitation from NTV99 to participate in their programs?

[NSRS representative] Our party has not received such an invitation.

[Unidentified Serb Party of Krajina, SSK, representative] We have considered this possibility, but some people from the party came and said that they would not accept such a thing because they would have to go under police escort, because of guarantees and so forth. So we cannot talk about democracy if you have to be under police escort every time that you come and go and this is the same for both sides. That is the kind of explanation you get from people, but I personally am in favor of it.

[Reporter] Is that not a violation of Dayton?

[SSK representative] Well, no, people are still afraid. We all have to understand that. People still lack trust, so they prefer to stay within their own circle. As far as I am concerned, I am always for dialogue, as it were,

for negotiations, at least in the political sphere, and, as for the more human relations, they are yet to come.

[Reporter] Have you received an invitation from NYV99 to participate in their programs?

[SSK representative] Well, it is not out of the question. We could. We would probably respond to an invitation from independent television.

[Reporter] But have you received such an invitation?

[SSK representative] No, we have not, not from independent television.

[Marinovic] I am Milenko Marinovic from the Serb Patriotic Party—SPAS. We are not using your slot, because we have still not received an invitation from you. I hope that when we receive your invitation we will respond to it positively.

[Reporter] What about an invitation from state television?

[Marinovic] We are using the slots on Serb television. However, we have not yet received an invitation from Television Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Reporter] They have offered you a slot. Have you not been informed about it?

[Marinovic] No, not as yet.

B-H: Poll Shows SDS Most Popular Party in Serb Republic

AU1508153996

[FBIS Report] Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian on 10-11 August on page 7 carries an approximately 1,000-word report on the results of an opinion poll on the coming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina entitled "Participation en Masse in Elections." The report does not state by whom the poll was conducted but does provide the following information:

"The poll was carried out using a multistage, stratified sample of the voters from the town and suburban local communities and the rural local communities in the Banja Luka municipality at the end of July 1996. The poll involved 616 respondents. The size of the sample allows for a 2-percent margin of error."

The report also adds: "In our research, as many as 86.6 percent of the respondents were not members of any political party; 7.35 percent were members of the SDS [Serb Democratic Party]; 1.96 percent were members of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic; 1.14 percent were members of the Serb Patriotic Party; and 0.98 percent were members of other parties."

The results of the poll are summarized in two bar charts and two pie charts and are expressed in percentages. The bar charts do not, however, show figures but depict the bars against the scales showing percentages in units of five. The figures are therefore only approximate.

Which party has the most serious candidates in the elections?

	Percent
People's Party	2.5
Alliance for Peace and Progress	6
Democratic Patriotic Front	7
Serb Radical Party	8
Serb Democratic Party of Serb Lands	42.5
Serb Party of Krajina	1
Nikola Pasic Workers Fatherland Front	0.5
Serb Peasant Party	0.5
Serb Patriotic Party	1
Party of Serb Unity	1
Some other party	3
None	17
No answer	6

Do you have a clear idea of how you will vote in the elections?

	Percent
I know clearly	48
I know	7
I do not know	41
No answer	4

Which political party can fulfill your expectations in the near future?

	Percent
People's Party	4
Alliance for Peace and Progress	8
Democratic Patriotic Bloc	7
Serb Radical Party	11
Serb Democratic Party of Serb Lands	33

Which political party can fulfill your expectations in the near future?	
Serb Party of Krajina	2
Nikola Pasic Workers Fatherland Front	1
Serb Peasant Party	1
Serb Patriotic Party	3
Party of Serb Unity	3
Some other party	5
None	17
No answer	5

Now that you are thinking about the coming elections, will you vote?	
	Percent
Yes	82
No	6
Do not know	12

B-H: Commentary Views SDA Attitude Toward Elections

AU1608091096 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
14 Aug 96 p 4

[Commentary by Josip Vricko: "Has Izetbegovic Already Made His Choice?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Americans are deliberately disregarding whatever is not an open threat to the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the Bosnian opposition and the rare independent media in Bosnia-Herzegovina have estimated. Judging by the present experience, the tolerance of the Americans—and the tolerance of the OSCE—is almost infinite.

However, there is a question of what those who want 14 September to come as soon as possible and to pass in what is usually called a democratic atmosphere consider to be an "open threat." The party in power, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], has put the tolerance of the international arbiters to a test on several occasions.

The "historic September" cannot be shaken by the bleeding head of the former prime minister [Haris Silajdzic], the silencing of the presidency members and the media, or the political commotion in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton decision on the elections is indisputable, regardless of which army (or which party,

there is no difference in that) "liberated" which part of the state.

The SDA had something to say just when the preselection situation led us to believe that the opposition would give up on the elections. The SDA's message was that the party is not interested in 14 September, as the basic conditions for democratic elections were lacking. It is also foreboding to see that the SDA leader and the head of state, Alija Izetbegovic, is remaining quite silent, although Sarajevo has received a number of important visitors recently.

His allegedly private visit to Turkey, which took place shortly before Tudjman and Milosevic met in Athens, was interpreted by some foreign media—and in rare Bosnian media—as looking for a shoulder to cry on. ABC even thought that Izetbegovic went to tell Demirel about his party's decision regarding the elections. Whatever the truth may be, the president of the Bosnian presidency did not comment on the recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Kornblum, Solana, or Granic (especially not Granic), although all of them visited Sarajevo.

Christopher will have that honor today in Geneva. Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic will also have the honor—provided that Izetbegovic has recuperated (in Turkey). Among other things, Izetbegovic will have to promise that his party will enter the elections as arranged, because the elections would not make much sense without it. Demirel has probably explained that to Izetbegovic, who has been almost too cooperative on all previous occasions.

However, Izetbegovic's scenario for the Bosnian electoral play (with quite a number of tragic elements) is rather simple—stall all you can to get all you can. Undoubtedly, Herzeg-Bosnia is still the greatest Bosnian problem in the eyes of the official Sarajevo—despite the preselection orgies of the Chetniks in the alleged Serb entity and the announcement made by potential Bosnian presidency member Momcilo Krajisnik that the Serbs will separate from the Croat-Muslim entity after the September elections. As the Croats have already said that they were ready to solve the problem according to the Dayton agreement, Izetbegovic will probably knock on an open door in Geneva. Still, he might have something else in mind.

One of the slogans on the SDA campaign posters reads: "One religion, one state." If that will be Izetbegovic's idea in the Geneva negotiations (and Geneva has heard all kinds of ideas from him), the war graffiti in Sarajevo—"Sign it, Alija, build the fence" ["Potpisi, Alija, da je ko avlija"]—will be more than a war anecdote. Elections cannot change that. Perhaps that is

why Izetbegovic and his party do not find 14 September too important.

B-H: Krajisnik Discusses Postelection State Organization

AU2108172896 Sarajevo Radio Slobodni Izbori
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1030 GMT 21 Aug 96

[Interview with Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic and candidate of the Serbian Democratic Party for the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Miodrag Stanic; place and date not given; from the "Portrait of a Party" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stanic] Mr. Krajisnik, this is an opportunity for you to address on Radio Slobodni Izbori the voters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly those that you count on as a party and party candidate. The first question refers to the state organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and how you see it as a candidate.

[Krajisnik] Throughout the war, we have had a conflict among the three nations aimed at organizing the mutual relations, what kind of relations the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslim should have. I think it is no secret that the Serbs wanted to preserve the SFRY, the former Yugoslavia, and to achieve their state interests within it as a nation. When that failed, and when Yugoslavia unfortunately fell apart, we then wanted to separate within Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were two options there: One was to have a state of our own, and the other was to link up with the rest of the Serb nation, that is, the then Republic of Serb Krajina, Serbia, and Montenegro.

The Dayton agreement brought a solution that does not completely satisfy our side or the Muslim side, which wanted to have a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor the Croat side, which was publicly for Bosnia-Herzegovina but secretly wanted to integrate their territories into Croatia. The compromise of the Dayton agreement is in the fact that a semisolution has been found, a solution that contains the partial interests of all three nations. Bosnia-Herzegovina was supposed to be called a republic, state, or union in Dayton, but we could not find a compromise, so it was simply called Bosnia-Herzegovina without any attributes that any such creation should have. We now refer to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a union, and I see that the Muslims and Croats refer to it as a state. That is a free interpretation. In fact, Bosnia-Herzegovina is what it is in the Dayton agreement, and it will be whatever it will be after the elections and the implementation of the Dayton agreement. I want to say very clearly that I was against the Dayton agreement because of its faults

to the detriment of the Serb people, but as much as I was against the Dayton agreement then, now I am completely committed to its implementation. As a man, I have always been inclined toward not accepting what is not in our interest, but if something is accepted as the minimum, it should be followed through. We Serbs have always criticized Stipe Mesic [last president of the SFRY Presidency], who headed a state and yet worked against it.

Let me conclude with how I think we should work on Bosnia-Herzegovina: I think that a small number of functions have been determined for the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is a member of the United Nations, and the small number of joint functions that have been envisaged by the Dayton agreement, I think should be implemented. We are largely satisfied. We have our independence, and we will remain committed to all the rights that the Serb Republic has according to Dayton. We will not oppose the joint functions, but will continue to work on the fulfillment of those rights.

[Stanic] How do you, as a candidate for a three-member Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, see the achievement of the Serb national interests in the future, and is this Dayton solution enough for the Serb people to achieve their national interests fully on the territory called Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Krajisnik] I have just said that we are not satisfied. We wanted a completely clear solution, and I think that this would have been more honest for the Muslims, the Croats, and the Serbs. This solution to Bosnia-Herzegovina, I fear, is neither fish nor fowl. No one knows what it is. I am afraid that we have not found a correct solution. Bosnia-Herzegovina will either disintegrate into three, that is, two parts, or it will be more firmly integrated. To be honest, I think that the grounds have been laid for some kind of autonomous and causal links between two independent entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, held together by an umbrella that is much smaller than envisaged today. Maybe we will all be linked together by some economic ties on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but the basic condition will have to be met—the Serbs will not rule over the Muslims and the Croats, which was never the case anyway, nor will the Muslims ever rule over the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whether they will rule the Croats is their business entirely. I do not believe that they will have closer ties with Croatia because I think that the Muslims have fared much worse in the Federation than the Croats and that the Croats are claiming rights far greater than belong to them. We will not get involved in their affairs, but we are indirectly concerned by their affairs. If they do not sort out their relations, there will be no peace in Bosnia. We want

peace and that is why we want just relations between the Muslims and the Croats, since that indirectly influences peace.

[Stanisic] One of the gravest consequences of the four-year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the large number of refugees and displaced people. What is your attitude toward their return?

[Krajinik] I can give a political answer, a human answer, and a realistic answer. Politically, I should say that everyone should return home. That is true, this would be the most humane solution, and I would be the first in favor of people returning to their homes since people's memories and roots cannot be taken with them. Everyone who has been displaced is suffering. As a man, I must say that it would be a great thing if everyone could suffer as little as possible, if everyone could have compensation for leaving their places. But the realistic situation is that it is unrealistic for the refugees to return to their homes. It is not realistic for most of them to return. We have accepted this reality in the Serb Republic. I would certainly like to return to the place where I used to live, but I know that this is not realistic. If it is not realistic, I think that it is unfair to deceive the people with tales that they will return and then to artificially keep giving them hope instead of offering them other solutions. The real need is to figure out where people can return and where they cannot. If they cannot return, then there is a possibility of compensation, and it exists in the Dayton agreement. [passage omitted]

B-H: Klickovic Promises Tax Exemption at Election Rally

LD1908194696 Pale Srpska Televizija
in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 19 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Orthodox believers are today celebrating Assumption Day. Serbian Patriarch Pavle held a holy mass in the church of Apostles Peter and Paul in Topcider (in Belgrade). [passage omitted] Let us hear a report from Novi Grad.

[Unidentified reporter] The great Serb holiday of Our Lady's Assumption was marked with a number of celebrations in Novi Grad municipality. A special session of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] municipal committee dedicated to the party's sixth anniversary was held this morning. This was followed by rallies in (the Serb Valley), Agica Brdo, and Matavazi. SDS candidates running in the forthcoming elections were presented to several hundred people of Novi Grad and [Bosanska] Krupa municipalities outside the church in Matavazi.

Radomir Pasic, member of the SDS main committee and head of the municipal list, was the first to address the

people. He was followed by Mitar Lazic, a candidate for deputy in the Serb Republic assembly, and Simo Drijaca, [words indistinct] and chief of the security services. The rally was also addressed by Serb Republic Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic.

[Begin Klickovic recording] The Serb Republic government is doing everything possible to ensure regular income for all sections of society, and primarily for the dead soldiers' relatives, the people maimed in the war, and the pensioners. The outstanding pensions from 1995 and July 1996 will be paid out by the end of August. By the end of the year this government and the SDS leaders will implement the law on abandoned property and provide collective or individual accommodation for all refugees and displaced persons.

We will soon adopt a program of measures to encourage life in the Serb Republic's border areas. These measures will apply to all those living and working in the border areas and cover the provision of much higher wages for medical and teaching staff, as well as other employees of the state, and complete tax exemption for farmers and workers in these areas. [end recording]

[Reporter] The forthcoming elections are an opportunity for the Serbs west of the River Drina to set up a Serb state. In a word, 14 September is the day of decision for the Serbs in this area. This was the message sent out from the rally in Matavazi.

B-H: SDS Official Predicts Landslide Victory for Party

LD2008153896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1005 GMT 19 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 19 Aug (SRNA)—The victory of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] in the September elections is absolutely imperative for the survival of the Serb people in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said SDS Presidency Secretary Vlado Vrkas in an interview with SRNA today.

[SRNA] Mr. Vrkas, on several occasions you said you believed that the SDS will win a landslide victory in the September elections. What do you base this belief on?

[Vrkas] Above all, on the party's state-building and freedom-loving character and on the tested qualities of its candidates which were demonstrated over the past six years, in particular in organizing the Serb people to defend themselves from a planned genocide and to realize their legitimate rights, primarily the right to self-determination.

The politicians are not the only ones who can successfully cope with daily pragmatic issues, this can also be

done by people who think and act in a state-building fashion in every moment. [passage omitted]

I would like to stress that the SDS was the last party to emerge as a national party, which means that its goal was not what is now being imputed to it—to cause secession and war. Secession was carried out by the western part of former Yugoslavia, by the puppet governments of Slovenia and Croatia, and then by Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

The SDS has not incurred any debts for the Serb Republic abroad. We defended ourselves, we used our own uniforms, and ate our own bread; those who are now saying that we ruined our country's economy are maliciously ignoring the fact that we started to build our state in the forest with our own efforts and skills.

Of course, a war situation is a hotbed for illegal actions of all kinds, but even in such circumstances we successfully dealt with such problems. In any case we did it more successfully than the leaders and parties from the FRY, Serbia and Montenegro, which—under peaceful conditions—allowed financial scandals to happen, such as the Dafiment [bankrupt Serbian bank], the Jugoskandik [bankrupt Serbian bank] or the alco-mafia [as received].

People who were or still are leaders in the FRY are directly responsible for these financial scandals and they exported some of them to the Serb Republic. Such people today impute to the SDS that it rallies people who have unscrupulously robbed their own nation, all with the clear intention of earning extra election points.

Briefly, the SDS is an authentic, state-building, democratic, and freedom-loving party; all our efforts have been crowned with the creation of the Serb Republic and the firm commitment for the concept of a single Serb state. Therefore, I believe that the SDS will score a landslide victory in the September elections.

[SRNA] Almost all opposition parties and blocs in the Serb Republic emphasize in their name the concepts of Serbdom, patriotism, progress, and peace. However, the history of political dishonesty has also seen electoral swindles. Mr. Vrkas, how should we see through such dishonesty here, and how should we explain to our people what is at work behind the scenes?

[Vrkas] Communists in the FRY and their puppets in the Serb Republic, these "wolves in sheep's clothing" who call themselves socialists, liberals, independent democrats, and so on, are Machiavellians. Communism—that first of all means greed for power. A communist—that is first of all a person greedy for power. Communists do not know democratic institu-

tions, communism and democracy simply do not go together.

All their pledges of democracy expressed in party platforms and at rallies only represent hypocritical political marketing and nothing else. Until yesterday these people were obedient observers of the notorious Article 133 which sanctioned the so-called slandering of the state. The chairman of the Socialist Party of Serbia [Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, chairman of the SPS] used to say in 1990 that all the Serbs would live in one state, and today he wants all the Serbs to live in one party—his party, which does not mean living in the same state.

The SPS publicly says it is for completely democratic and fair elections with the equal participation of all parties, while at the same time it uses secret channels—I daresay in a collaborative way—to supply the OSCE and Carl Bildt with information alleging the SDS's bullying and monopolistic conduct, thus siding with [Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija] Izetbegovic and those who wish to label the SDS as a terrorist organization, and see it excluded from the electoral race and elections.

Unlike other parties in this area, the SDS is an authentic people's party. We are not a remote-controlled party, we do not wish to be remote-controlled brains which are switched on and off from Dedinje [suburb of Belgrade where Milosevic lives].

The SDS believes that the interests of the people and the Serb Republic as an already created state should be protected. In this context we are different from some opposition parties that function on the remote control principle.

It is evidently incongruous and absurd that at the same time the SPS, as the headquarters of left forces, should ignore official representatives of the Serb Republic and urge normalization of relations with the Muslim-Croat federation; in this I refer to the meeting between Milosevic and [Federation Vice President Ejup] Ganic. On the other hand, the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic declares itself in favor of the Serb Republic as a state. The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic should react to these things if their advocacy for the state of Serb Republic is not only an electoral swindle.

It is obvious that communist parties put on their nationalist clothes only when they need them to stay in power, and afterwards they take a U-turn. The SPS stands as a glaring example of this practice. Therefore, I believe that the people in the Serb Republic totally understand the position, characteristics and final

objectives of the parties that are taking part in the elections.

[SRNA] Several opposition parties directly accused the SDS of responsibility for incidents during their election campaign meetings. Complaints are also coming from Belgrade about unequal media coverage of the opposition and the ruling party. How much truth is there in these accusations and complaints?

[Vrkes] The roots of this attitude lie in the fact that part of the international community believes that the SDS will comfortably win the forthcoming elections, so they are looking for a way of eliminating our party before 14 September. All of this is part of a bigger puzzle where some international factors, unable to beat us by democratic means, try to gain advantage by accusing the SDS of being a terrorist organization.

If that scenario is successful, "the terrorist party" will at some later stage be barred from the elections, they will add the fabricated responsibility for the failure to implement the Dayton Agreement, and even more serious imputations are possible. The final aim of all of this is to remove the SDS from the political scene and to impose some occupation or puppet authorities in the Serb Republic. That is a transparent and cheap scenario.

On the other hand, communists and other political chameleons, scattered in several left wing parties, are playing the card of being the victims of the media in the election campaign in the Serb Republic, which vividly brings to the mind the memory of the media victim used during the war by the Muslims and their lobbies in the world. They saw that this was a good card to play, regardless of all possible consequences, that is, in a Machiavellian way.

What is important and what I would like to stress is that, as the ruling party, the SDS has—through the state bodies and the media—done everything it could in order to establish democratic conditions and a democratic preelection atmosphere, and to ensure that all parties, regardless of their political orientation, enjoy more or less the same and satisfactory media coverage. But, as a responsible and serious party, the SDS must take into consideration how much coverage the official media in the FRY give to us and how much to the opposition in the Serb Republic.

Milosevic's Socialists demand more democracy, more media coverage for their proxies in the Serb Republic, while forgetting the small or nonexistent official Belgrade media coverage of the tragedy of Serbs from the RSK [former Republic of Serb Krajina in Croatia] and the exoduses from the western parts of the Serb Republic and Sarajevo.

In that respect, I affirm with full responsibility that there is more democracy in the postwar Serb Republic than in the FRY unless, of course, democracy means that everyone can do what they want.

[SRNA] Mr. Vrkes, how do you interpret the fact that there are so many parties compared to a relatively small electorate in the Serb Republic—one party per less than 40,000 voters? Can we really suppose that this is an attempt to fraction the Serb electorate?

[Vrkes] The Serb nation—and I speak about it as a whole—has been brought to the verge of a complete demographic rift due to the lack of a united national program, in which the Serb communists have not shown any interest, and are still not interested. The SDS is constantly warning about this danger, but our voices are still drowned in the general ideological and demagogical noise set off by the communists in the territory of the present FRY in 1990.

[Former Yugoslav president and writer Dobrica] Cosic once said that a nation "without a collective program and aim is a servile mob and is historically dead," and I would add that it is easy to manipulate. This is why, I think, that so many parties across the Serb territory, which means in the Serb Republic too, are a direct consequence of the absence of a national program but also—and I would like to stress this in particular—a communist attempt to disorientate the people again when basic national interests are at issue and to cheapen the Serb political thought in general. [passage omitted]

[SRNA] Leading political parties in the Serb Republic—the Socialist Party and the Democratic Patriotic Bloc (DPB)—frequently criticize the SDS, saying its representatives in state institutions do not know how to interpret and implement the Dayton Agreement.

[Vrkes] They are trying to tell the people that they are better qualified and that they know more. Also, they form part of an orchestrated campaign against the SDS, alleging that it is obstructing the Dayton Agreement, and that it should be banned from the elections. They tow the same line regarding the SDS as Izetbegovic, Ganic, and [Haris] Silajdzic. They would not be ashamed of such a victory as they are used to coming to power in an undemocratic way.

Regarding the Dayton Agreement, I must say that it was written in a strange mixture of political and legal terminology and we believe this was not done by chance. The Dayton terminology deliberately leaves room for maneuver in subsequent political interpretations and implementations. For example, we cannot discuss the arbitration court for Brcko, because, according to Dayton, it is an arbitration court for the interentity line in the area

of Brcko. That is why we are so cautious and why we insist that the words written into the framework agreement must be defined precisely.

Another reason for caution is the Dayton separation map. It is not by chance that Clark's border guards have drawn, from an economic and strategic point of view, a very expensive border without any respect for the basic guidelines of drawing borders. We are constantly being criticized for issuing appeals to people to be on their guard. It is evident that through the thoughtless cutting off of transportation roads, cities, and territories someone wants to achieve something that does not exist in the agreement. That is, according to Izetbegovic, the "reintegration" of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the transformation of administrative, AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of Yugoslavia] borders into state borders.

It is evident that ways are being sought to politically destroy the SDS and create the conditions for people and political parties who will take the Bosnian Serb Republic into a united Bosnia-Herzegovina to enter the political stage.

Although it can be seen as a part of Clinton's preelection campaign, we respect the Dayton Agreement and we intend to do everything to implement a stable peace. But we will not allow a subsequent arbitrary interpretation to deprive us of even the level of sovereignty which we obtained in Dayton. We demand that all signatories, guarantors, and those implementing the Dayton Agreement respect every word that was written into it.

Finally, I would like to stress that many of our opposition parties are being financed by sources unknown to us. In some cases, such as [Zivko] Radisic's Socialists [Socialist Party of the Serb Republic] and [Milorad] Dodik's Social Democrats, money is being extravagantly spent. So, the Dayton Agreement interpretation also depends on the sources of finance and the amount of money one receives. And that should be condemned.

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[SRNA] A great number of SDS members, even some people from the leadership (Radic, Kupresanin, Brdjanin, Adiz) left and joined other parties, often of very different political persuasions. Why?

[Vrkes] In the time since the SDS entered the political scene, and in view of the number of votes the Serb people had given it, it is evident that it had surpassed the boundaries of a party and had become a national movement. Our main task was to unite all Serbs in their lawful struggle for self-determination. Considering our mass appeal, it is only logical that we have had different trends and members of different political views. That also shows the democratic spirit within the party itself.

In the run-up to the elections, the SDS had to define its party image. A clear determination for a Serb state and the unification of all Serb lands remained at the very core of its national policy, while the basis of its economic program is privatization.

The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) accuses the SDS of isolating the Serb people within the Serb Republic. At the same time, we all see that the socialists support for social ownership—which the world does not recognize as an economic category—does not mean anything but the isolation of the people in Serbia. Not to mention the fact that the SPS and the United Left (JUL) are already giving an amnesty to the so-called party ownership which the League of Communists of Yugoslavia favored.

It is now that I would like to stress that the SPS and its satellites in the Serb Republic have nothing in common with the authentic European parties of the same political prefix. They are simply relics of a Bolshevik era.

As we have clearly chosen the modern concept of development for our state, it is only logical that a certain percentage of personnel should leave. Following their political beliefs, they have simply opted for other parties. But, in the final instance, I believe that the departure of some people only contributed to the greater strength of the SDS.

[SRNA] The Muslim prime minister, Hasan Muratovic, has publicly expressed his wish for a SPS and JUL victory in the Serb Republic. Why?

[Vrkes] Muratovic's wish does not surprise me, just as I was not surprised by Ganic's message to Muslims in Sandzak and other parts of Serbia after he returned from Belgrade. He told them to organize themselves politically, to put forward their candidates at the elections in Serbia and to accept local self-rule within the FRY. It is, according to him "something that must be done, something that Europe and the world want."

Ganic's invitation to the Muslims in the FRY means a huge U-turn in Serbian-Muslim relations; I primarily mean Belgrade-Sarajevo relations. It is evident that Belgrade will enter into some kind of trade in this connection, predominantly trading votes in the forthcoming elections. It is obvious that a tacit agreement has been made that some Muslim votes, particularly those from abroad, are to be given to opposition parties in the Serb Republic, primarily to the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic. A party of that caliber—once it has been consolidated as a strong opposition party or even if it wins the elections—will try to drag the Serb Republic into the unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This is not in the interests of the Serb people or the Serb Republic, but it would please the Muslims and the current authorities in the FRY which need to gain legitimacy, considering that a significant number of Albanians and Muslims did not take part in the last elections. It is obvious that they are continuing to trade with the future of the Serb nation, not only with territories, as happened with the republic of Serb Krajina, but in this case with votes.

Therefore, the SDS has called on all Serb refugees in the FRY and Serbs living abroad to come to the Serb Republic to cast their vote, because that is the only way in which we can control their votes. All those votes that come from abroad will be rigged.

It is significant that Yugoslav consulates abroad have not made it possible for the Serbs living there to check voters' lists and to vote. They directed them to Bosnia-Herzegovina consulates and embassies. This is also a sign of the horse-trading characteristics of the current political authorities in the FRY. [passage omitted]

The FRY must protect the Serb people in this area and must be a guarantor in the eyes of its own people for what has been signed in Dayton. I would like to say that dangers for the Serb Republic and the FRY have not passed with the signing of the Dayton agreement.

In this connection I would like to say that some optimistic visions by the SPS and JUL in connection with Kosovo only pull the wool over people's eyes. The Kosovo issue will show who is next in the communist line of scapegoats. [Milan] Martić was the first and Karadžić came second. It will be interesting to find a scapegoat for Kosovo because political leaders in Serbia always put the blame on someone else, they themselves are never to blame. All this is based on the untenable formula of governing: All power belongs to me, all responsibility is yours.

I would like to say that such a policy can no longer win support among the Serbs in the Serb Republic because our own experience and that of the republic of Serb Krajina show us that the primary guarantor of our security can be the institutionally, economically, and legally strong Serb Republic, a stable and consistent national policy pursued by the SDS, the Serb army and police—everything that has been endorsed in Dayton.

[SRNA] Is it realistic to expect some U-turns in Belgrade in connection with at least national policy?

[Vrkes] In difficult historical moments the Serbs have always managed to find people capable of finding a way out in a dignified way. We sincerely hope that some change of that kind will take place on the political scene in the FRY, because everything has its best sell-by date, manipulation included. History is very whimsical, and in this context politics is not always the skill of the possible.

One cannot bury one's head in the sand in the face of obvious danger. Kosovo is in for a very hot political autumn. The national front of the liberation army of Kosovo, the most militant terrorist wing of Albanian secessionists whose actions are synchronized by Bonn and Tirana, is already active there. In addition to a U.S. office which is already there, Germany is to open its office very soon and European observers are to be deployed. All conditions for a political or even military secession of Kosovo will be met. The sand in the political arena will not be deep enough for the current authorities in Serbia to bury their ostrich head. [passage omitted]

It is with regret and bitterness that I have to say that Mr. Milošević invites us to Belgrade only when there is blackmail or some order must be carried out. This is why we are trying to take every opportunity for

direct contacts between Serb Republic state officials and international community representatives.

We expect the forthcoming elections to create an atmosphere in which the Serb Republic will be able to communicate directly with the international community to a much greater extent. The SDS is struggling to ensure that the elections are held by the given deadline and to legitimize in the eyes of the international public the voice of the Serb Republic and everything that we have done over the past six years. I think that the elections will create a qualitatively new basis for direct contacts and international establishment of the Serb Republic.

I think that the mediation of Mr. Milošević and the SPS did us more harm than good because we were unable to tell the international community directly what we wanted. We could not take a diplomatic initiative.

Simply, the SDS policy did not contain anything artificial. We said that it was impermissible to put relative value to the right to self-determination and that the SDA [Party of Democratic Prosperity] and the Muslims cannot just say, Bosnia is ours and that's that. During the war, during all the negotiations and all offers that were put forward, we advocated the argued stance that we are the owners—according to land registers and the constitution—of so much of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory and institutions and that we want to organize that as our demographic and constitutional areas for our people.

We did not ask for anything that belonged to someone else in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was a legitimate stance. The SDS did not request anything that was not part of the legitimate rights of the Serbs in this area and anything that was not in line with international law. [passage omitted]

[SRNA] At the SPS congress, Milošević said that the Serbs in the Serb Republic were "the receivers of Serbian citizens' solidarity," but that "peace without alternative" ushered in the time when Serbia, as he put it, "must turn to itself." Can you comment in this context on the messages from meetings of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic that all roads go through Belgrade?

[Vrkes] I must say that a common feature of all leftist parties is that they do not acknowledge the category of a nation and national interests. They simply believe in some kind of international interest, and Mr. Milošević's statement does not surprise me in the least in that sense.

That statement is perhaps a kind of digest of his policy from the setting up of the so-called Zabljak Yugoslavia, which constitutionally rejected the Serb people of the Serb Republic and the republic of Serb Krajina, leaving

them to their own devices and to the mercy of the postbloc spheres of interest within the international community. Everything that happened after that was a logical consequence of such SDS policy.

However, I would like to pay tribute to the Serbian people in Serbia on this occasion again, because they helped the Serb Republic and the Serb people in these areas in all kinds of ways, and this must never be forgotten. But I personally will never forget either the sanctions on the Drina or the fall of the republic of Serb Krajina.

I neither can nor wish to forget that Martić is not allowed to travel freely through all the Serb lands. He can only travel through the Serb Republic, which was the only country that accepted him. I will never approve of the vocabulary used by some impudent people here and abroad who call Radovan Karadžić a war criminal, or who impute terrorism to the SDS and blame it for the war.

How could the war have been caused by a party whose chairman was not a member of either the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency or the presidency of former Yugoslavia? Therefore, this person—even if he had wanted war—was not in a position to make decisions leading to war.

I would like to repeat: The September elections are more than elections, because they will not only decide which party will be in power, but also in whose country we are going to live. Hence, I would like to call on all voters to support national democratic parties which will make sure that they live in their own country. The other two nations will do the same.

We believe that a democratic framework should be created in the Serb Republic. That is what we are working on, and I believe we are doing it successfully. [passage omitted]

[SRNA] How do you comment on Ganić's visit to Belgrade and his talks with Milošević? (In an interview for the July issue of ZAPADNA SRBIJA [Western Serbia] Martić said the following: "All secret talks that Milošević had with Croatian representatives and about which we learned from terse and generalized statements, were held in our absence and we were left guessing what their consequences would be.")

It is obvious, Mr. Vršes, that Milošević is continuing with the same practice when it comes to the Serb Republic.

[Vršes] Ganić's visit to Belgrade is a first-rate political scandal and a huge offense to the Serb nation. It is a well-known fact that Ganić was directly in control of

the massacre of the Yugoslav People's Army soldiers in Dobrovoljacka Street [in 1992 in Sarajevo], that he is a war criminal, and that the FRY has issued a warrant for his arrest. However he was received with top state honors in Belgrade and many "bargaining" deals were struck with him over there.

The Serb nation as a whole should sober up and tell the international community what it wants, because they know perfectly well what we do not want. This boils down to taking a diplomatic initiative.

The contacts between Belgrade and Zagreb and between Belgrade and Sarajevo are aimed at establishing the independent states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina within their AVNOJ borders [republican borders within the former Yugoslavia drawn by Tito in 1943]. The SDS is completely aware of this.

One can talk about the normalization of political and economic relations in this area in accordance with the Dayton agreement, with the Serb Republic on one side and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other.

We do not dispute the right of the federation, i.e., the Muslims and Croats, to organize their life according to their wishes. I wish the federation had fewer problems when it comes to Mostar, Bugojno or any other contentious issue. I would also like to say that the federation today has many more internal problems than in its relations with the Serb Republic. [passage omitted]

[SRNA] Let us go back to the elections. Why, only a month ahead of the elections, has the OSCE not yet produced the official report on the size of the electorate?

[Vršes] That indeed is a silence that speaks volumes. OSCE representatives must know that the manipulations and rigging of the elections in order to install puppet authorities, which the people do not want, in the Serb Republic, might result in chaos.

I have to say that the communist opposition in the Serb Republic claims that these are free and democratic elections, but you know very well that under the OSCE rules 150,000 people of Krajina do not have the right to vote. That amounts to discrimination and deliberate crippling of the Serb electorate. This clearly shows whose favorites Radišić and his comrades are, and what their ultimate intentions are.

[SRNA] Mr. Vršes, what is your vision of the Serb Republic after the elections in which, as you said, 150,000 people of Krajina will not be able to take part, but in which around half a million voters from the Croat-Muslim federation and another 50 countries will vote for the Serb Republic's authorities?

[Vrkes] We believe in our people's political instinct and reflexes. Without a doubt we believe that the people who built blood, tears, sweat, and their minds into the foundations of the Serb Republic will not allow all that to be politically destroyed by various manipulations. What would they write on the graves of the soldiers fallen for the Serb Republic? They could not possibly write that they have fallen in the name of the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is why we will win the September elections.

As for the Serbs from the Krajina, wherever they are, the door to the Serb Republic will always be wide open to them. We believe that in the next elections, in two years time, they will have the right to vote and we will fight for that. The SDS accepts all Serbs from the republic of Serb Krajina and will fight in the future to ensure that as many of them as possible settle down in the Serb Republic territory and begin living with dignity. Mr. Martić is working on enabling most Serbs from the Krajina, who are currently in the FRY, gradually to return to the Serb Republic.

I must say that our postwar recovery has slowed down for the simple reason that international funds are being denied us in order to force by economic blackmail the Serb Republic, its people and leaders to give up even that level of sovereignty which is guaranteed under the Dayton agreement.

Our government has drawn up a program, under the guidance of Deputy Prime Minister Velibor Ostojić, providing at least a roof over the head for all people and getting rid of collective accommodation by this autumn. I hope we will be able to do this despite all the difficulties.

The Serb Republic is the fatherland of all Serbs, wherever they live, and whichever Serb comes here he will find the bread and salt of the Serb spirit.

B-H: Ombudsmen Report on Human Rights Situation

AU1608200996 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 7 Aug 96 p 9

[Article by Dragan Stanojlović: "Police Breach Human Rights"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The ombudsmen of the Federation, Vera Jovanović, Esad Muhibić, and Branka Raguz (they sign all their acts together, in alphabetical order of their last names) have completed the report on their work of the first six months of this year, in three languages—Bosnian, Croatian, and English—and forwarded it to all competent domestic and foreign institutions and organs. The only difference between last

year's report on the state of human rights and freedoms on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the same document for the first six months of this year is that the latter document contains even more critical assessments and it has been written in an even sharper tone.

Right at the beginning of this document the ombudsmen state that the "authorities of the Federation are not used to any supervision of the authorities" so that "instead of the promised cooperation they put up with various forms of resistance to the work of the institution of ombudsmen. They did that by refusing to accept our recommendations, by refusing to answer our letters and other acts of the ombudsmen, and, eventually, by refusing contacts and avoiding meetings and discussions, both with the ombudsmen and with their assistants." The evaluation of this behavior refers primarily to state organs on the municipal and cantonal levels, which creates a picture in the public that it all concerns "self-initiative behavior of local authorities." However, the ombudsmen deny that energetically, and state: "We believe that local authorities are not exclusively responsible for the breaches of human rights, because they are under the influence and the directives of the official policy from the top!"

Arrests, Harassments...

This is why the ombudsmen warn that "it is now the final moment for a direct and stronger involvement by the international community in the sphere of enabling the freedom of movement," and that "there has come to an utter legal insecurity in the respect of the implementation of the amnesty law and of the Dayton Agreement as a whole." [sentence as published] The ombudsmen illustrate their claims with the recent arrests in Sarajevo, Mostar, Kiseljak, Tomislavgrad, Zenica, Bihać, and other cities (those arrested are always members of minority peoples). Besides, the ombudsmen say that there are lists and warrants against the people whom the authorities of the Federation, and also of the Serb Republic, have designated as war criminals. Those lists have not been published anywhere, but they cause fear, prevent the freedom of movement, and they make arrests possible.

The ombudsmen report that of all the Federal organs, they have most problems realizing cooperation, which is foreseen in the constitution, with the police. "According to the data from our office, we assess that the biggest breaches of human rights occur because of the inactivity and of illegal work of the police." The ombudsmen support that statement with examples in which the police have refused to give legal protection to the citizens, and the "members of police often appear as perpetrators

of criminal and other acts to the disadvantage of the citizens."

The ombudsmen find the reasons for this behavior of the police on the territory of the Federation in its one-national structure, and in the lack of any subordination and responsibility, "because the police are not unified. Specifically, there is still no federal police force that would be commanded by the minister and the deputy minister, who are of a different nationality. There is still the police of Herzeg-Bosnia, which is one-national; and the police on the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which also has some members of other nationalities, but their number is minor." Direct consequence of that situation is the complete insecurity of the citizens who belong to minority peoples (reintegrated parts of Sarajevo, Mostar, Capljina, Bugojno, Bihać, Zenica...), which is the reason for those citizens to continue to move out.

Personal and property security of the members of minority nations on all territories of the Federation is severely endangered. Stating that the military police do not offer any protection to the citizens either, the ombudsmen gave an example from Kakanj, where the military police "refused to detain and interrogate a member of the special police of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, who shot at a group of teenaged boys, seriously wounding one of them, and then, with his friends, brutally attacked the wounded, bashing his head on the wall, and when he thought that the boy was dead, he threw him into the gutter and left him there." The ombudsmen also point to the behavior of the Federal policemen in the reintegrated parts of Sarajevo, where they demand money from the citizens of Serb nationality, threatening that they will be arrested as war criminals; they "break into homes and after identifying themselves as members of the police they search the homes, interrogate and physically harass people, they cut the telephone lines, etc." That has provoked 30 Serb families to move out of Vogosca after the reintegration, as well as 25 from Ilidza, and around 100 people from Ilijas.

In the western part of Mostar armed policemen have broken into apartments in which retired and other former members of the former JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) live, thrown them out claiming that the apartments belong to the HVO (Croatian Defense Council). The members of Bosniak and Serb nations in Prozor, Stolac, Capljina, and Neum are completely deprived of the freedom of movement.

In case after case, there are strong accusations about the behavior of the police, including the statements that the military and civil police in Tuzla, Sarajevo, and Mostar

refuse to assist when illegal occupants of apartments and offices are moved out, which is a legal obligation. Among interesting examples of the heavy breaches of human rights and freedoms the following can also be picked out: "In the village Podbnjesce, mostly inhabited with Croats, around 50 members of the unit El Mudzahedin [name as published] (consisting mostly of members from Iran, Sudan, and Libya) endanger their personal and property safety [of the inhabitants], because, beside constant terrorizing of that population, they occupied their houses, and moved in with the families. Members of this unit have also forcefully occupied several homes of Serbs in the vicinity of Zavidovici."

Pilot Failures

On the territory of Sarajevo and Mostar the ombudsmen have recorded problems regarding the issuing of personal documents for the members of minority peoples. On the territory of Bosanska Krajina the sympathizers of Fikret Abdić can get no travel documents "because the police consider them to be terrorists," or, on the grounds of the same accusation, it deprives them of their old passports.

In their report on the state of human rights in the Federation in the course of the first six months, the ombudsmen devoted a special chapter to the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. No "pilot programs" and "additional agreements" have helped start this process—which is crucial for the total restoration of human rights and freedoms, but also for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina (very commendable but almost inconsiderable exceptions in this case are the return of Abdić's followers from Kuplensko [refugee camp] and the "pilot program" in Travnik). The ombudsmen have identified four basic obstacles for the return, in the following order:

- the lack of political will and the attitude of the authorities towards this problem;
- severe breaches of human rights in the protection of property;
- lack of freedom of movement;
- lack of enforcement of the amnesty law.

A number of examples and explanations on the situation in this area of human rights and freedoms leads to a very indicative conclusion that neither the Bosniak, nor the Croat or the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina still show any signs of readiness to solve this problem. The "findings" of the ombudsmen in the field of realization of the right to work confirm this. Namely, members of minority peoples cannot realize this right anywhere on

the territory of the Federation, but in addition to that there are also some very indicative data that people of a different political orientation than that of the ruling parties, regardless of their nationality, cannot realize that right either, and that they can even lose it.

**B-H: Companies Want To Invest in RS
Hydropower Plants**

*LD1908181696 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1738 GMT 19 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Trebinje, Aug 19 (TANJUG)—Greek, Italian, Japanese and even Croatian companies have expressed interest in investing in the construction of three hydropower plants in

southeastern Serb Republic (RS), the director of the Trebinjica hydropower plant Jovo Maric said Monday.

The construction of Bileca, Dabar and Nevesinje plants is expected to be initiated soon, Maric said.

The three plants with a total capacity of 250mw are expected to cost about 300 million dollars, Maric noted.

Greek company AIK from Athens has expressed the greatest interest in investing in the projects, as well as Italian company ANSALDO. An offer also arrived from Japan five days ago and Croatian power industry representatives were also interested, he added.

Croatia: Serbs Fault UN Use of 'Force' in E. Slavonia

LD2108131896 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1028 GMT 21 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, Aug 20 (TANJUG)—The government of the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem said Tuesday [20 August] that the appearance of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] armoured vehicles in the streets of Beli Manastir Tuesday was an unnecessary demonstration of force.

The government of the region will inform U.N. Administrator Jacques Klein in writing of the UNTAES action carried out on the occasion of the opening of an office for issuing Croatian documents in the town, a statement issued after the government session in Vukovar says.

Region President Goran Hadzic said at the session that what happened in Beli Manastir was not a demonstration of force but a demonstration of UNTAES powerlessness, underlining that Transitional Police Chief Petar Djukic had helped avert a larger-scale incident.

A memorandum on the opening of the Croatian office says that its security is to be ensured by the interim police force and U.N. civilian police. It is therefore unclear why UNTAES civilian and military units interfered and why armoured vehicles of the Belgian battalion were ordered out, the government said.

Prime Minister Vojislav Stanimirovic said the region's government had given its approval in principle to the text of the memorandum, but did not sign it because it considers the Croatian amnesty law inadequate and because Croatian authorities refuse to return registry books to Vukovar.

Stanimirovic informed the government that Klein had regretted the stance taken by the region's government saying he would undertake an executive action, and that he considered the memorandum as a valid document regardless of the refusal of the region's government to sign it.

Croatia: Serb Refugees in E. Slavonia Want Right to Vote

LD2108200696 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1824 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, Aug 21 (Tanjug)—The Association of Serb Refugees and Expelled Persons in the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem Wednesday asked the U.N. Administrator Jacques Klein to enable the refugees to take part in the

elections scheduled for the end of the transitional period in the region.

The 70,000 Serb refugees, citizens of the former socialist Republic of Croatia now accommodated in the region, are deeply concerned at the statement by Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic that refugees would have no right to vote in the elections prior to the departure of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia], the association said in a letter.

The letter quotes Kostovic as saying on August 17 that only the citizens who had permanent residence in the region in 1991 would be allowed to vote, and warns that this statement is directly contrary to the Erdut Agreement.

When the Croatian Army attacked the Republic of Serb Krajina last summer, over 70,000 Serbs found refuge in the region and another 200,000 fled to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska.

In line with the Erdut Agreement, the region was placed in the beginning of this year under transitional U.N. administration for one year, with the possibility of extending it by another year.

The letter underlines the wish of Serb refugees to return to their former homes but expresses doubt regarding that possibility as Croatia's laws give priority to the settlement of Croats, who are being given the property of the expelled Serbs.

The fears of Serb refugees that they will be unable to return home are growing after Croatian authorities once again declared areas formerly inhabited by serbs open for settlement by croats, the letter says.

The exercise of the right to vote of Serb refugees in the region would be the first direct impetus to the process of repatriation, both of Croat refugees to Vukovar and other towns in the region, and of Serb refugees to western Slavonia and Krajina, the letter says.

Croatia: 2 Serbs Arrested for Suspected Part in Rebellion

LD2108142596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Zadar police arrested two members of the Krajina Serb paramilitary formations in Benkovac yesterday, the Zadar-Knin police administration has revealed. A warrant for their arrest was issued by the Croatian military and police authorities.

One of them is from Benkovac. He was driving a car with German registration plates when he was arrested during a routine traffic check. The other is from Bjelina near Benkovac, and he was found in Benkovac.

The police and military warrant for arrest was issued on the basis of the founded suspicion that, as a member of the Serb paramilitary formations, he took part in the armed rebellion against Croatia. Both detainees are being held in the Zadar county jail.

Croatia: FRY Says No Croatian POW's in Yugoslav Prisons

LD2108141296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the conclusion of two-day talks in Zagreb between Croatian and Yugoslav working groups for POWs and missing persons, Yugoslav representatives claim that not a single person sought by the Croatian side is kept in Yugoslav prisons. In a brief statement after the talks details on the killed and missing persons that were exchanged by the two sides during the talks were presented. Aleksandar Stankovic has a report:

[Stankovic] Of the overall number of 2,605 persons on whom Croatia wanted information from the Yugoslav

side during the two-day meeting, the Serbs presented official details on approximately 600 identified persons who had already been known to be dead by the families of the war victims. They also supplied information on around 300 unidentified persons for whose identification a special working commission will be set up.

The Croatian side gave the Serbian side details on three POWs and on a further 149 persons who have been in prison since Blijesak and Oluja [Flash and Storm—Croatian Army operations carried out in 1995] and who are currently being tried before Croatian courts. The Croatian side also presented details on approximately 600 people killed during Operations Flash and Storm.

Major Ivan Grujic, the chairman of the commission for POWs and missing persons of the Republic of Croatia, said that negotiations were proceeding as planned, and announced that another meeting would be held in Belgrade on 15 September when details on the dead would be presented. [passage omitted]

Poland: Details of New U.S. Hellfire Missile Offer
WS2208103596 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish
22 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "More on the U.S.-Israeli War Over the Polish Skies; Who Will Arm Our Huzar Helicopter?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] At the government level, Poland selected the Israeli NT-D missiles, which are still only prototypes in the development stage. However, during the process of negotiating the multistage contract with the Israelis, it turned out that our potential partners wanted the Polish side to take most of the risk (nearly 90 percent) related to the joint missile-helicopter project.

The trade talks came to a deadlock. As SZTANDAR found out from well-informed sources, just before the change of Cabinet in Tel Aviv, an attempt to improve the situation was made by former Israeli Prime Minister Simon Peres, who personally sent a letter to the Polish deputy prime minister.

During that time, Rockwell proposed integrating its own electronic systems of guidance and aiming with the construction of the Polish helicopter. This process would make it possible to arm the Huzar helicopter with both the Israeli-made NT-D missiles and the U.S.-made Hellfire missile.

According to some sources, the Israelis might accept such a solution. Their condition would be to keep the most important part of the missile contract.

However, Rockwell and Boeing recently offered to immediately sell Poland a complete assembly line for the Hellfire missiles for approximately \$40 million. The offer also encompasses the necessary elements enabling the assembly right at the start of 600 AGM-114F Hellfire missiles in the Mesko plant in Skarzysko-Kamienna.

Payments would be made on very favorable terms, our sources claim. They add that, in just over three months, the Polish Armed Forces would thus be saturated with modern antitank missiles.

The Americans also give assurances that, on similar terms, Mesko might soon be able to assemble another ultramodern version of the Hellfire missile—the AGM-114L, which is unofficially referred to as the Longbow or the Mini-Hellfire and which is being developed in cooperation with Great Britain.

Poland: Reform of Central Government Bodies Detailed

WS2208101896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 21 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by Malgorzata Subotic and Krzysztof Olaszewski: "How the Central Administration of the State Was Reformed; It Begins With the Liquidation of the Office of the Council of Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *If the president signs all of the laws on reform of the central administrative and governing bodies, and if the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party agrees on a new distribution of the ministerial portfolios, then, starting next year, the Council of Ministers will have a new structure and the prime minister greater powers. The government must issue executive acts related to the laws the Sejm passed in August. Seven ministries will be liquidated, and three new ministries will be established: the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, the Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of the State Treasury, as well as the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, the Government Center for Strategic Studies, and the Committee for European Integration. The prime minister will have a great deal of freedom in forming his cabinet; he will be free to alter the scope of the activity of the various ministries, appoint ministries without portfolio, and act as chairman of all of the committees of the Council of Ministers. The reform of the central governing bodies places the prime minister closer to the chancellor-based model.*

The changes are to begin on 1 October, and the last of the new ministries will be set up on 1 January 1997. However, in order to see to it that the reform is implemented, the government must issue appropriate ordinances after the package of the laws on the reform of the central governing bodies appears in the "Legal Gazette." [passage omitted]

The Superministry

The reform of the central governing bodies will begin with the liquidation of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM]. Some of its tasks will be taken over by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, but most of them will be handled by the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs. Aside from issues linked to the initiating of government policies regarding state security and public law and order, supervision over the activities of the police, the Border Troops, the State Fire Brigades, civil defense, and so forth, the new ministry is to be responsible for the functioning of the government administration and cooperation with

territorial self-governments. The whole area of church-state relations, which is now within the powers of URM, will be handled by the new ministry. The Ministry of Construction will also delegate some of its powers to the new superministry—construction supervision, land surveying, and cartography.

The task of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister will be to ensure broadly understood servicing of the head of the Cabinet. The person in charge of the Chancellery is to be appointed by the prime minister. The Chancellery will also service a certain newly established body—the Collegium for the Special Services. Establishment of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister puts an end to a rather absurd situation in which the apparatus that is responsible for the servicing of the prime minister is subordinated to his political colleague in the Cabinet—the head of URM.

The Chancellery, like the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs, is to be established on 1 January 1997. Before that, on 1 October of this year, the Office of State Protection [UOP] will be excluded from the structures of the Internal Affairs Ministry and subordinated directly to the prime minister.

Supervision Over the Treasury

The second element of the reform of the central governing bodies is the change in the functioning of the economic ministries. Mieczyslaw Czerniawski (SLD), who chairs the Extraordinary Commission for Reform, said in the Sejm that the primary reason for preparing the reform was the necessity of separating the managing functions of the ministries from the regulatory functions; another reason was the need to put an end to the division of the economy according to branches and markets.

Since 1989, representatives of nearly all political parties have been talking about the necessity of introducing mechanisms and institutions that would effectively protect those interests of the State Treasury that are related to its assets. For this purpose, the reform introduces an entirely new office, the Office of the Minister of the State Treasury, which will be established on 1 October. As part of this office, the reform envisions establishment of the Privatization Agency. Initially, the government proposed establishment of a separate Privatization Ministry in place of the current Ministry of Ownership Transformations. However, this idea was opposed by the Sejm deputies. It was decided that establishment of two related ministries might give rise to considerable friction within the government because one ministry would deal with the sale of the assets of the State Treasury and state-owned companies, whereas the other would supervise and, in a way, defend them.

The main tasks of the minister of the Treasury will be to take general care of the interests of the State Treasury, to manage, and to privatize—if this is justified by economic needs. The minister will also be able to initiate privatization of municipal assets. Privatization of some branches of the economy, such as telecommunications, the power industry, and air transport, will remain within the powers of other ministers. The minister of the Treasury will take over the stakes in companies that are subordinated to him between 1 November 1996 and November 1997.

Privatization of state-owned companies will be handled by an agency that will be set up specifically for this purpose and that will be supervised by the Treasury minister. The procedure related to the appointment and dismissal of the director of the agency is rather complex. The person who will have the right to make such decisions will be the prime minister, but he will be able to actually make them in agreement with the minister of economy. Supervision over the work of the Privatization Agency will also be exercised by the supervisory board, which will be made up of representatives of some economic ministries.

On 1 October, voivodes will take over the rights of founding organs in relation to 1,300 state-owned companies. By that time, the Council of Ministers should issue executive acts that will determine which companies will not be under voivodes. The government may also draw up a list of companies whose founding organs would be government institutions other than the minister of the Treasury.

The Committee and the Assistance of Experts

The authors of the reform of the central governing bodies did not forget Poland's plans to join the EU and other international institutions. Therefore, the reform envisions establishment of the Committee for European Integration (on 1 January 1997), which will be chaired by a member of the Council of Ministers (it is worth adding that, in line with the reform, it will be possible to set up other committees that will be chaired by ministers). The Committee for Integration will deal with such issues as adjustment of the Polish law to the EU norms and preparation of integration programs. Among those who will take part in its work will be the foreign affairs minister and the president of the National Bank of Poland. The committee will publish its own Official Gazette.

The director of the Government Center for Strategic Studies, which will replace the Central Planning Administration [CUP] on 1 January 1997, will be a member of the Council of Ministers. In line with the intentions

of the legislators, the center is supposed to be an organ of assistance for the prime minister—an institution consisting of experts that would help the prime minister head the government. The expert character of the institution is stressed by the provision that says that the center "cooperates with the Polish Academy of Sciences, scientific institutions, and institutions of higher education." The Council of Ministers will also be able to use programs of economic and social development, evaluations of the international situation of the country, and concepts of foreign policy, all of which will be prepared by the center.

Three Rolled Into One

An entirely new office, with considerable powers, will be the Ministry of Economy (on 1 January 1997). It will take over the powers of the ministries that will be liquidated: the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, and the Ministry of Land Use Management and Construction. The role of the minister will be to initiate state policy in the area of the economic development of the country and to carry it out. He will also work out short- and medium-term socioeconomic programs. Once the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation is liquidated, the minister of economy, together with the head of the Polish diplomatic services, will represent the government in this area. He will deal with issues related to activity in the area of trade and services; he will also be responsible for the condition of the state reserves and for the functioning of the energy systems.

The Strategy of the Ministry of Economy

The reform of the central governing bodies also considerably changes the position of the finance minister. In line with the new law, his primary task is preparation of the draft budget and supervision of its implementation. In an interview with GAZETA BANKOWA, Marek Pol said that in certain areas the position of the minister will be weaker (for example, he will lose ownership powers in relation to strong financial and insurance institutions), whereas in other areas it will be stronger—he will exercise supervision over the customs services administration, which will help protect budget receipts. According to him, in the previous governments we witnessed an incessant dispute between the finance minister and the CUP head over such issues as, for example, powers in the area of creating the state's economic policies. "One of them had the law on his side, whereas the other had huge powers over the economy," Pol says. The objective of the reform was to strike a balance between the influence of the finance minister and the new minister of economy. The former is to think in terms of one year—he is to prepare and implement the state budget and manage the public finances—while the latter must think three to five years ahead; now it will be his task to prepare a document such as the "Strategy for Poland."

The position of the head of the Finance Ministry will still be relatively strong because management of public finances is one of the most powerful instruments the government has at its disposal. "The intention behind the reform was to prevent situations in which the CUP head, who does not have any powers as far as initiating legal regulations is concerned, must get involved in a dispute over who has the powers to create economic policy. The finance minister had an advantage over each of the five ministers—industry and trade, foreign economic cooperation, land use management and construction, transport, and communications. He was in a position to make it more difficult for them to obtain money from the budget. As a result, after some time every minister who kept both feet on the ground did not risk getting involved in a polemic with the finance minister. Therefore, we want to have a situation in which opposite the finance minister there will be an equally strong minister of economy," Marek Pol sums up.

The government estimates that once the last of the new ministries is established, the transition period for the government administration will last another few months (at least three). This means that the earthquake in the central administration will end no sooner than the second quarter of 1997. Some of the officers who are working there now will have to look for another job. However, how numerous they will be will be known after the first stage of implementing the changes is completed.

The Schedule

Early September (if the president signs the rest of the laws that make up the reform soon): executive acts issued on the laws in question (ordinances of the prime minister and the government), appointment of plenipotentiaries for establishing new offices and appointment of liquidators of the old offices, granting of statutes to ministries and specification of their internal structure;

1 October: establishment of the Ministry of the State Treasury and of the Privatization Agency as part of this office, liquidation of the Ministry of Ownership Transformations, establishment of the Committee for European Integration, transformation of the Anti-Monopoly Office into the Office for Protection of Competition and Consumers; voivodes will take over the powers of founding organs in relation to 1,300 state-owned companies;

1 January: The Ministry of Economy will be set up, and the Law on the Finance Minister and on Tax Offices will enter into force; liquidation of the URM and establishment of the Office of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration, establishment of the Office for Housing and Development of Towns and of the Office for Land Surveying and Cartography.

Romania: Romania, Hungary 'Destined' To Join NATO at Same Time*AU2108142596 Bucharest AZI in Romanian
19 Aug 96 p 4*

[Report by Liana Segă on news conference given by Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party, in Cluj on 16 August: "The Fact That We Were in the Government Is Not a Handicap for Us but, Rather, an Asset"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] During a visit to Cluj County last week, Mr. Petre Roman, the candidate of the Social Democratic Union [USD] to Romania's presidency, gave a news conference and appeared in a live broadcast on the local television station CINEMAR. Answering questions from journalists, the president of the Democratic Party [PD] said, among other things:

I am not surprised that Mr. Funar [president of the Romanian National Unity Party-PUNR] is opposed to the conclusion of a treaty with Hungary in its present form. His statement is quite in line with PUNR policies. I can tell you that, from the very emergence of Recommendation 1201, the PD's position has been that Romania should observe its commitments toward the European structures, including the Council of Europe; hence, toward the recommendations of that forum. Then, we insistently demanded that Recommendation 1201 should be interpreted in keeping with Romania's domestic policy principles, that is, without collective rights and autonomy on ethnic criteria. This interpretation was accepted by the Council of Europe. Regarding the treaty between Romania and Hungary, we believe that it should be concluded, since it now contains, for the first time, direct references to observing the borders with Romania and the stability in the region. Therefore, it is in Romania's interest to sign this treaty.

The USD's economic and social program has been finalized and will be made public on 31 August. It is a program of economic growth which was put together after a serious study by specialized groups. [passage omitted]

In the long run, the solution of the problem of corruption presupposes a conglomerate of legal provisions and the political will to better organize the justice system and allow it to do its duty. On top of this, one should eradicate the corruption at the top. [passage omitted]

I have often spoken out for a civilized electoral campaign. I am against exacerbating the sensational during this campaign. [passage omitted]

The fact that we were in the government is not a handicap for us, but rather an asset. We have made mistakes, some of which were inevitable, others not.

Nevertheless, on 28 June 1990, we submitted to the Parliament—which, for the first time in 50 years, was an elected assembly—a government program which was adopted without opposition. We have not digressed from this program for 15 months. [passage omitted]

Romania and Hungary are destined to join NATO together. My attitude toward a would-be discrimination in this respect is clearly stated in my latest report submitted to the NATO Council, and it is summed up in the title of one of its chapters: "The Freeze After the Spring." If Romania and Hungary are committed to joining NATO, they must prove that there are no problems between them, particularly of a territorial nature. Hence, the need to speedily conclude the bilateral treaty. NATO members have a veto right even on the issue of new members. The admittance decision must be made unanimously. If they find it hard to control what is happening on Hungary's borders, the vote will not be given too easily. As a matter of fact, what Romania lacks, if it wants to gain the maximum trust of the NATO allies, is a more obviously democratic policy. Therefore, if the fall elections will produce a power that is more committed to the idea of democracy, Romania's chances to join NATO will increase. [passage omitted]

Our strategy for the current presidential campaign is to draw to us those people who no longer want to vote for the current power, as they did in 1992, but who are undecided for whom to vote.

Romania: Article Examines 'Turn' in U.S. Policy*AU2108154396 Bucharest AZI in Romanian
14 Aug 96 p 5*

[Article by Adrian Severin: "America! America!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Has there, perhaps, been a turn in the U.S. policy regarding Romania? Has, perhaps, the United States lost interest in Romania? These are the questions we should be asking ourselves, with increasing concern, while contemplating the events of the past few months.

It is true that, at the beginning of this year, U.S. President Bill Clinton publicly announced the decision made by his administration to examine, with good intentions, the possibility of granting Romania most-favored-nation [MFN] status on a permanent basis, but only after the legislative and presidential elections scheduled for the fall of 1996 are over in our country. Until then, they strongly recommended that the Bucharest regime should firmly follow the road of democratic reforms, speed up the privatization process, and see to it that the upcoming elections are free and correct. It was understood by us that the fate of the MFN status and the U.S.

friendship symbolized by it depend on the extent to which Bucharest is ready to take those recommendations into consideration. This is why the democratic forces in Romania welcomed with much satisfaction the stance displayed by the head of the largest democracy in the world.

All of a sudden, however, things started happening differently. The status was granted for an unlimited period of time. This happened on a proposal of the U.S. executive, which was endorsed by a large majority in Congress, without setting any conditions and without any further recommendations or reserves.

Of course, the fact that we obtained the status, for which both the government and the political opposition had been fighting, made us all happy. Nevertheless, one cannot help trying to discover the reasons behind this sudden change in U.S. policy. What could be hiding behind this change? What is it that must have changed in Romania in the time lag between the first U.S. declaration and the moment they granted the MFN status?

The answer to the aforementioned question is "nothing," or, at least, "nothing good": privatization is stranded, as it merely resulted in the transfer of the old government monopolies to the hands of a few people enjoying the protection of the corrupt ones currently ruling the country; democratization turned out to be the oligarchization or the PDSR-ization of the country [reference to the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania, PDSR]; individual liberties have been violated on numerous occasions, and cases such as the attacks against the BBC and RADIO FREE EUROPE or the jailing of journalist were not totally insignificant; the chauvinistic nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance practiced by the government and the ruling parties have registered new peaks; and local elections were held under the sign of abuse and fraud.

So which could be the reasons for this unexpected U.S. generosity? The surprise is so much greater, as, this time, the "barrister" pleading in Congress for the Romanian cause was no one else but Congressman Tom Lantos, the same person who in the past proved to be a sturdy censor of the Iliescu regime and who has won himself the reputation, justifiably or not, as being a prominent figure of the so-called Hungarian lobby.

As one cannot find an explanation in Romanian reality or the evolutions in this country, one ought to look for it somewhere else as it is very hard for anyone to believe in fairy tales such as the sudden improvement of the efficiency of Romanian diplomacy, that suddenly the U.S. congressmen felt deeply moved, or that the U.S. Administration suddenly began to distinguish between

the Romanian people, to whom it granted the status, and the Romanian Government, at whom it is thumbing its nose.

However, if one casts a glance outside Romania's borders as well, one would notice that the most important event that took place at the beginning of this summer, from the point of view of the strategic interests of the United States, was not the "dramatic" electoral clash between Ilie Nastase and Victor Ciorbea [running for the post of Bucharest general mayor], but rather the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia.

During the Russian electoral battle, the United States had its own candidate, if one may say so, by staking everything on Boris Yeltsin. The U.S. political analysis, a concoction of shortsightedness, prejudice, and self-deceit, considered "Tsar Boris" a champion of democracy, liberalism, the law-governed state, and peace, and this served as a basis for the exceptional material and political support they granted to him almost totally openly. The results, however, did not match their expectations: Russian society proved to be profoundly split between the hopes for an uncertain future, the vague contours of which do not even resemble democracy, and their nostalgic feelings for a past filled with order and miserable certitude. Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov strengthened his moral and political authority, the large-scale popular support for him and the relative majority in the State Duma offering him the possibility to influence, to an increasingly significant extent, the policy of the Russian Federation. The career of General Lebed, a beginner in politics, whose greater-Russian imperial inclinations and his idea of frustrating order exceed by far his ability to elaborate subtle strategies. His diplomatic raffishness and managerial qualities also ascended with the speed of a lightning, he is possibly now the number two in the power hierarchy and already seems to be becoming a new Rutskoy (the one who led the 1992 coup in Moscow).

Boris Yeltsin himself proved to be unable to win, on his own, a new presidential term, and only managed to achieve this by accepting compromises and association with Gen. Lebed, as well as by making promises that have too little to do with the spirit of an open society and market economy and that are far too difficult to keep to avoid large-scale social complications in the future. On top of all this uncertain and confusing situation, there is the Sword of Damocles of the Russian president's precarious health, a vulnerability that could prove to be decisive in the event of possible coups, mutinies, or crisis situations of any other kind.

By watching closely the logic of the U.S. policy with respect to the Russian Federation, which demonstrates the

exceptional importance and almost sickening fascination the two countries have always felt for and shown each other, one can conclude that, in order to turn their recent "investments" in the Russian elections to good account, the U.S. Administration now has to grant further backing to Boris. Only such additional support could consolidate the latter's position and lend genuine and stable significance to his electoral success. Could it be, perhaps, that the United States abandoning its political interest in Romania, with the consequence, among others, of leaving our country outside NATO, is a concession made by the Clinton administration to strengthen the Yeltsin administration and improve Russian-U.S. ties? We are too scared to even consider such a hypothesis.

To what extent could the granting of permanent MFN status without insisting on the political preconditions formulated by President Clinton at the beginning of 1996 be interpreted as the sign of such a new U.S. stance with respect to Romania? Usually, whenever the United States is interested in establishing stable, alliance-type political relations with a country, they always insist that the latter should adopt the model of American society. By this, they express the truth that the equivalence of internal political regimes is the best guarantee for the success and stability of alliances on the international plane. The United States is able to coexist, cohabit, and possibly even establish economic relations with countries that have opted for differing social-economic models. Superpowers can adjust and have to be able to adjust to any other entity that manifests itself internationally. They are able to tolerate, provided certain limits are not exceeded, the existence of any other kind of political regime in other countries, regardless of how much they differ from their own model (in our case, the U.S. model). Normally, however, alliances can only be struck with similar political regimes.

This is why as long as the United States used the granting of the MFN status to exert pressure for the evolution of the democratic process in Romania in a convergent direction with those in consolidated democracies, and especially with American democracy; this could be interpreted as an indication that the U.S. Administration wished or intended to establish a Romanian-U.S. alliance. By renouncing such pressure, the United States seems to indicate that it no longer cares what is happening in Romania and that our country has been struck off the list of possible allies.

Under such circumstances, the granting of MFN status on a permanent basis—a rather symbolic gesture, as the extension of the status each year would have been more or less inevitable, as the sole countries currently not benefiting from this commercial privilege

are such as Cuba, Cambodia, or North Korea—merely expresses their limited economic interest, which is perfectly understandable, considering the U.S. need to protect their market, which is threatened by the expansion of their great economic rival, the EU.

The nationalist or pseudonationalist Romanian press termed the fact that Romania obtained permanent MFN status "a Romanian victory over the Hungarian lobby in the United States." If such a lobby did genuinely exist as a united and unique entity, it is quite interesting that, this time, it favored, or at least it seemed to favor, Romania. Could it, perhaps, be that they had to back this move of the U.S. Administration in implementing its new policy in its relations with Romania and Russia as a price they had to pay for Hungary's admittance to NATO without having to comply with the precondition of having to normalize Romanian-Hungarian relations?

Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu made an edgy statement in Washington, saying that if Romania is not admitted to NATO simultaneously with Hungary, our country might be pushed toward the influence sphere of other regional powers that are already exerting pressure upon it. I wonder which powers Mr. Melescanu had in mind. Did he refer to Russia, or rather the Community of Independent States? Such a perspectives do not look especially attractive. Or did he rather mean Germany or the EU? The PDSR did everything possible to increase tension in our relations with the latter.

As a consequence of this, the Iliescu-PDSR regime is heading with great speed toward turning Romania into a buffer zone, a kind of no-man's-land used to deposit political waste, situated between the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Asian fronts. If President Iliescu has become the principal pawn articulating the new Russian-U.S. compromise just for the sake of him being able to keep power, but to the detriment of our national destiny, this is by no means the fault of the United States, but much rather our own. Those who keep pointing to the map and emphasizing Romania's geostrategic importance in an attempt to convince the United States that it has to love us regardless of everything would be better advised to notice that the huge Russia is our neighbor and to try to imagine how this factor is perceived on the banks of the Potomac.

The Americans, whom we have been vainly awaiting every fall since 1944, will not care about Romania as long as it is under the occupation of Ion Iliescu and the PDSR. This is precisely why the "moment of struggle for national liberation" has arrived for us all. Otherwise all that is left for us is to go on whispering with a sigh: "America! America!"

Postscript: I wrote this article a few weeks ago, but, for various reasons, it was not published until today. In the meantime, the U.S. Senate has endorsed the earmarking of special funds to finance the integration of Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic into NATO.

Romania: PDAR Head Urges Signing of Treaty With Hungary

AU2108163796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Victor Surdu, president of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR], said at a news conference today that the basic Romanian-Hungarian treaty should be signed before the the electoral campaign begins in our country so it does not become an electoral issue for certain groups. Regarding Emil Constantinescu's [president of the Democratic Convention of Romania-CDR] statements in an interview published by JURNALUL NATIONAL, the PDAR leader said that the CDR president made a big blunder which will be used by the opposing candidates. However, Mr. Victor Surdu said these claims are not representative and are not included in any program of the CDR's candidate.

Romania: Marko Urges Hungary To Consider UDMR Views

LD2208121696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 22 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have asked Bela Marko, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [UDMR], to comment on yesterday's statement by Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs that the Hungarian Government will sign the basic treaty even if the UDMR and the opposition are opposed to it.

[Begin Marko recording] I think the statement is contrary to the cooperation we have built up over the past few years. It must be admitted that the Hungarian Government has considered our opinion on numerous occasions. We would also like them to consider our opinion now. There are some significant points in the draft treaty which we cannot agree with.

By the way, I have received feedback that two consultations will take place with government representatives. [end recording]

**Slovenia: Bosnian Opposition Candidates
Reportedly Detained**

AU2208085396 Paris AFP in English
0845 GMT 22 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 22 (AFP)—Two senior opposition politicians from Bosnia were detained by police in Slovenia as they were about to address an election meeting, Sarajevo media reported Thursday [22 August].

Ivo Komsic, head of the Croat Peasant Party (HSS) and currently a member of Bosnia's ruling presidency was led away from his hotel along with another opposition politician on Wednesday evening, the daily *Oslobodjenje* reported Thursday.

Nijaz Skenderagic, a leading member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Komsic's HSS are the main parties in the so-called Unified [United] List, the chief opposition grouping in Bosnian general elections September 14.

The paper said the two men thought the police had arrived to provide protection on their way to the election rally in a building elsewhere in the Slovene capital Ljubljana.

"The police told them that according to Slovenian laws they cannot hold an (election) meeting because it was not properly announced. They were threatened that if they did hold it they would be charged," *Oslobodjenje* reported.

The paper, quoting Komsic, said that Croatia and Slovenia, both former Yugoslav republics, were the "only two European countries that do not allow political meetings of such kind."

According to the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) there are some 16,500 refugees from Bosnia. Under complex rules governing Bosnia's vote, electors can vote in absentia. A crowd had apparently gathered to listen to the two politicians the paper added. Another meeting planned for Thursday was cancelled.

**Slovenia: 'Political Sources' Wary of FRY-Croatia
Accord**

LD2008185096 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1834 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, Aug 20 (TANJUG)—The normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Croatia will considerably weaken Slovenia's position in the region and jeopardize its efforts to dispute Yugoslavia's right to full succession to the former

Yugoslav federation, Slovenian political sources and media said Tuesday.

Slovenian Foreign Ministry refused to officially comment the Yugoslav-Croatian agreement on normalization expected to be signed next Friday by the two foreign ministers, Milan Milutinovic and Mate Granic.

It is too early to draw conclusions, the ministry said.

By establishing diplomatic relations with FRY and by recognizing to the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro continuity with the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia will leave Slovenia on its own in its policy of isolating Belgrade, sources in Ljubljana said.

Analysts in Slovenia also said that Croatia was already preparing to settle territorial, property and other disputes with Slovenia without any compromise, encouraged—among other things—by its new ties with Belgrade.

**Slovenia: SFRY Property Division Plan Creates
Dissatisfaction**

LD2108154496 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1517 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, Aug. 21 (TANJUG)—The Slovenian delegation participating in the succession talks considers the plan of division of property of the former Yugoslavia (SFRY), soon to be put forward by international mediator Arthur Watts, to be unfavourable for Slovenia.

Head of the Slovenian negotiating delegation Miran Mejak on Wednesday indirectly warned of the possibility of considerable change in the "balance of power" in future succession talks, following the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia.

Watts's model of division of property of the former Yugoslavia has not taken into account some major requests of Slovenia and Croatia, Slovenia's political circles claim.

TANJUG learns in Ljubljana that Slovenian delegation believes that the international mediator has deviated from some fundamental conclusions of the Badinter commission on the disintegration of the former Yugoslav federation, by making the greatest concessions to Belgrade so far.

Mejak said he hoped Croatia would continue backing Slovenia so it would not remain alone in its requests to get as large as possible portion of property, foreign exchange reserves and gold of the former Yugoslavia.

Federal

FRY: Round Table Discusses Fate of Croatian Serb Refugees

LD2108194996 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1817 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 21 (Tanjug)—The head of the social program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Jacob Tschaye said Wednesday in Belgrade it was useless to discuss the return of Serb refugees to Croatia before Zagreb proclaims general amnesty.

He made the statement at a round table on the problem of refugee repatriation, which noted that refugees accommodated in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia felt there was little chance of their ever returning home, and that their integration in local society was slow and traumatic.

The vice-president of the Association of Refugees in FRY Jelena Kljajic said Serbs expelled from Krajina were in the most difficult position as no one guarantees them anything in Croatia and the Dayton Agreement does not mention Serbs anywhere.

The participants said that general amnesty was not the sole condition for the return of Serbs to Croatia, they also need housing, jobs, health care, pensions, schooling for children, etc.

The round table was attended by experts of different professions (psychologists, teachers, lawyers), and representatives of international humanitarian organizations, the Yugoslav Red Cross, Serbian commissioner for refugees, and refugees.

FRY: 35 Parties Sign Accord on Election Broadcasts

LD2108154596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1521 GMT 21 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 21 (TANJUG)—A total of 35 parties have signed the agreement on the number and duration of radio and TV broadcasts for the equal media representation of political parties and their candidates for the elections for the Yugoslav parliament's lower house on November 3, a Yugoslav government statement said Wednesday [21 August].

The agreement was signed on Monday by government officials of Yugoslavia and its republics Serbia and Montenegro, representatives of the Radio-Yugoslavia, Radio-Television Serbia and Radio-Television Montenegro.

All parties intending to participate in the Yugoslav parliamentary elections and not having signed the agreement yet, can do so until October 6, the statement said.

FRY: Serb Party Protests Lack of Media Access

LD2108184196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1558 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 21st August (SRNA)—The chairman of the Democratic Center (DC), Dragoljub Micunovic, said today that many parties were in an unequal position compared to the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) ahead of the federal [Yugoslav parliamentary] elections.

"The opposition's access to the media is not the same as that of the SPS and its satellites," Micunovic stressed at a news conference in Belgrade and added that his party and other opposition parties were "handicapped" from the point of view of financing. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Serbia: GSS Leader on Media Accord, Russian Plane Crash

AU2208081996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1135 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 21 August (BETA)—Vojin Dimitrijevic, member of the Main Committee of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS), has assessed today that the meeting among the representatives of the state-run media, the federal government, and political parties is "an unsuccessful and comical attempt" to sign the agreement on the media presentation of parties in the coming federal elections.

"This agreement could rather be called an order or a decree. It is a state order, that, to make it look nicer, was submitted for signing," Dimitrijevic stated at a news conference and pointed out that "serious parties do not intend to sign it." [passage omitted]

He also touched upon the Russian plane crash near the Belgrade airport, describing it as "frenzied circling by the plane, obviously loaded with dangerous cargo, that could have as well crashed in the center of Belgrade."

Dimitrijevic accused the authorities of not providing any information on the case to the public, and wondered: "Did the plane land in Podgorica and what did it unload there? Is it true that the plane was heading from the Urals toward Malta, and that it landed in Belgrade only for technical purposes? If yes, why are customs declarations being mentioned? What did one of our citizens based in Cyprus do on board? Was Libya, a country under embargo, the plane's final destination,

and did the authorities of this country violate that embargo?"

Serbia: Doubts Voiced Over Parties' Access to Media

LD2108190796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 Aug (TANJUG)—Vojin Dimitrijevic, a member of the main committee of the Civic Alliance of Serbia, said today that he doubts that the parties will enjoy equal access to the media during the election campaign for the federal [Yugoslav parliamentary] elections.

He told a news conference that the agreement on the party presentation in the media for the federal elections is "a state order submitted for signature."

Dimitrijevic added that the people who chaired the meeting at which the agreement was signed were not authorized to discuss the proposal put forward by the Zajedno coalition, and said that "all this clearly shows what access to the media parties will have."

Serbia: DSS Says Conditions for Elections 'Worse Than Ever'

AU2108203996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1208 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 21 August (BETA)—Mirko Petrovic, vice president of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), stated today that conditions for elections "are worse than ever" and that "it worries that some opposition parties want to take part in the elections in such conditions."

"The federal elections will be held under considerably more difficult conditions than in 1992. The conditions for elections are now much worse than they were in the first multiparty elections in 1991," Petrovic said at a news conference.

He said that the only possible answer by the opposition is "first of all, a boycott, or a joint list of four opposition parties." [passage omitted]

Serbia: 'True Party of Democratic Action' Registered

AU2108193496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1107 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Pazar, 21 August (BETA)—With the decree of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Serbia the True Party of Democratic Action [Prava stranka demokratske akcije—PSDA] was registered as of 29 July 1996.

SANDZACKI NOVINE Editor in Chief Esad Dzudzevic from Tutin was elected the party president.

In the statement by the Information Center of the Muslim National Council of Sandzak carried by SANDZACKI NOVINE, Dzudzevic said that this party was formed following the appeal by Sulejman Ugljanin, president of the Muslim National Council, to carry out preparations for the forthcoming elections in Sandzak.

The goal is that "the people of Sandzak be allowed to articulate authentic Bosniak policy through both parties," PSDA president said.

Kosovo

Kosovo: LDK Sources Cite Cases of Serb Police Violence

AU1908110196

[FBIS Report] Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English Nos 944, 945, and 946 on 14, 15, and 16 August carry several reports on Serb police violence against ethnic Albanians in various areas in Kosovo.

Citing Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) sources, KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 944 notes that on 10 August the Serb-run court in Kilan municipality "sentenced" an Albanian from Shtupel to "10 days in prison" under the pretext that "he had had a quarrel with his Serbian neighbor."

Sources in Suva Reka report that the Serbian police on 7 August "arrested" an Albanian and his son, who "were held at the police station all day" and "were beaten up severely" under the pretext that "they were in possession of arms." Sources confirm that they "were ordered to report at the police station again on 12 August."

A report from Vucitrn notes that, at 6 a.m. on the morning of 14 August, Serbian police "arrested" an Albanian at his home in Stanovc village. The Albanian was "released" after "several hours of interrogation at the police station in Prilluzh."

LDK sources in Klina say that the Serbian police on 5 August "stopped" an Albanian in the vicinity of Belgrade and seized 5,600 DM (German marks) from him. The Albanian, born in Shtupel village in Klina, "was on his way home from Germany." He was "threatened" that his passport would "be seized" and that he would "be sent to the Serbian Army if he reported the case."

On 14 August, a former Kosova security employee, who resides in Budisalc village, was "summoned to the so-called informative talks at the police station in Klina," LDK sources report. The Albanian "was questioned

about the recent incidents in Kosova and the activity of the Kosova Police Trade Union."

Quoting LDK sources, KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 945 on 15 August notes that the 66-year-old Ymer Bala, member of the Kosova parliament, was "released from the Gjurakovc prison" after having "served" his sentence of "five months in the Serbian-run prison" for "having allegedly been in possession of arms."

It is reported from Urosevac that on 8 August, two Serb policemen raided the house of an Albanian resident in Urosevac of Ferizaj, in search of his father. After telling the police that "his father had died two years ago," the policemen "ordered him to report instead." Sources confirm that the Albanian "was subjected to severe physical torture" at the Serbian police station in Urosevac.

On 6 August, three Serbian residents in Balaj village "provoked their Albanian neighbor" and "beat him up" although "he did not respond to their provocations." On the "same day," the Serbian police "detained" him and "questioned him about the incident," ordering him to "forgive the Serb who had beaten him up."

LDK sources in Mitrovica report that on 15 August, two Serb policemen "halted" many passers-by and "checked their identity" near the marketplace in Mitrovica. A 26-year-old Albanian resident of Melenica village was reported "beaten up by the police for no reason whatsoever."

KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 946 on 16 August says that during the late hours between 12 and 13 August, "four unidentified armed persons stopped and harassed passers-by" in the vicinity of Kacanik i Vjeter village. LDK sources report that "the unidentified persons spoke Serbian."

On 15 August, Serbian police headed by the chief commander in Istok "forcefully entered a number of restaurants" in Istok, LDK sources report. "The police raided the premises, intimidated the customers, and ordered the hotel's proprietors to close the restaurants though it was only half past nine o'clock in the evening," confirms the source.

Kosovo: Serb Police Reportedly Raid Albanian Party Office

AU1608172496 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Serbian police raided today (Thursday) [15 August] the premises of the UNIKOMB (Party of National Unity), situated in the Durmitori street in Prishtina [Pristina], capital of Kosova.

Around 11 o'clock a.m., two uniformed policemen "popped in" the offices of the Kosova Albanian party, where a meeting of the presidency of the UNIKOMB with local activists was being held, Sherif Konjufca, member of the presidency, told the Kosova Information Center (KIC).

Having only inquired about the nature of the meeting, the Serb policemen walked out, Mr. Konjufca said.

Half an hour later, those very policemen came back and threatened the UNIKOMB vice-chairman, Afrim Mustafa. Your party is not registered (with the Serbian regime, KIC), therefore you cannot continue operating, they told Mr. Mustafa.

A little while later, the same Serb policemen reappeared in the company of many others to raid on the party premises, Mr. Konjufca told KIC, adding: They broke up the meeting, ransacked the offices, and seized party documentation and printed materials.

All the participants of the meeting had their identity checked by the Serb police, whereas the party leaders: Afrim Morina, vice-chairman; Ali Shabani, secretary; Sherif Konjufca, Avdi Gjata, Uk Thai, Ramadan Uka, members of the presidency of UNIKOMB; as well as the technical staff, were intimidated by the police.

The UNIKOMB party has been frequently targeted by the Serbian regime in the past few years. The party leader, Mr. Ukshin Hoti, was sentenced to five years in prison by the Serbian regime for his political beliefs, that is his support for an independent Kosova. He was recently transferred from the Dubrava jail (in Kosova) to the notorious prison house in Nis, Serbia.

Mr. Sherif Konjufca said the raid of the Serbian police on the UNIKOMB party premises is aimed at obstructing the political activities of the party and intimidating the Albanian political forces ahead of the eventual talks process between Prishtina and Belgrade on the settlement of the Kosova issue.

Kosovo: Ethnic Albanians Undergo Serb Police 'Torture'

AU2108152496 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 19 Aug 96

[FBIS Summary] This issue of KOSOVA DAILY REPORT includes several reports on Serbian police violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosova, as well as Serb Army movements in several areas.

It is reported that in the afternoon of 19 August the Serbian police in Podujevo "raided" the homes of an Albanian writer and his brother. Reports note that the same Serbian police patrol "came back" and "arrested"

the writer's 21-year-old son. The two Albanian brothers went to the police station, where they were interrogated. The police told the writer that "his son will be held in custody until they turned in weapons they allegedly were in possession of," despite statements by the Albanian brothers that "they have no arms in their possession."

Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) sources report that during 16 and 18 August, the Serbian police patrols "have been raiding many Albanian households" in Mramor and Busi villages "under the pretext of arms searches." Dozens of Albanians had their houses raided by the police in various quarters. The wife of an Albanian was reported to have been "subjected to physical torture as the police behaved brutally while searching their house." Reports confirm that, "under the same pretext," the Serbian police on 18 August "raided" the homes of three Albanian residents in Balaj village.

LDK sources report that Serbian police forces have been observed to "parade" in Mitrovica streets, with the policemen were provoking passers-by by "pointing automatic guns at them" while parading.

It is reported that the Serbian police on 13 August "arrested" an Albanian resident in Istok, who "was taken at the Serbian police station" in Pec. While "in custody," the Albanian was "subjected to severe physical torture" and was "accused of having allegedly visited Albania and taken part in some military manoeuvres there." The Albanian was also charged with "having conducted the recent incidents in Kosova." The Albanian was "released" but "ordered to report back," confirms the source.

LDK sources in Kamenica report that between 5 and 8 August, the Serbian police have raided "dozens of Albanian households" in Muivrc village "under the alleged pretext of arms searches." According to the report, the police "targets" are mainly families whose members are migrant workers abroad.

The Serbian police also "raided" the home of an Albanian migrant worker in Switzerland and "seized" his passport. The police also "ordered" three Albanian brothers to "report at the Serbian police station on 10, 12, and 13 August" and "hand over some weapon allegedly in their possession." While "in custody," one of the Albanians "was reported beaten up."

On 13 August, the Serbian police "seized" the passport of an Albanian resident in Muivrc. The Serbian police on 15 August "raided" the homes of two Albanians, currently migrant workers in Switzerland, and told their family members to "report at the Serbian police station."

Sources in Gnjilane say that the Serbian police on 13 August "summoned" an Albanian resident in Gadish village to "report at the Serbian police station" in Gnjilane. While "in custody," the Albanian was "subjected to severe physical torture in connection with alleged arms possession." Sources note that "he was released but ordered to report back."

LDK sources from Mitrovica says that on 19 August, four Serb policemen in Mitrovica "arrested two Albanian youngsters," who "were taken at the Serbian police station in Mitrovica." The LDK Information Commission in Mitrovica "failed to obtain their names."

It is also reported that the Serbian police "raided" the home of an Albanian in Zhabar village in Mitrovica and "summoned" his son to "report" to the police station "allegedly in connection with arms possession." Reports confirm that "this was the fourth time in a row he was taken at the Serb police station" and was "exposed to severe physical torture."

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Ethnic Hungarians Express Concern Over Treaty Issues

LD2108203996 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1900 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Vojvodina Hungarians [UVM] supports Hungary's integration efforts but fears that Budapest will give up representation of the Hungarian minority's interests if that is the price of European Union accession.

[Correspondent] According to Executive Deputy Chairman Sandor Egressy, what is needed is plain speech rather than the reinterpretation of Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe a month after the Hungarian-Hungarian summit. What we need Budapest to do is to represent our interests on the international scene and not to patronize us, the UVM deputy chairman said, commenting on the finalizing of the text of the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty.

He fears that the Hungarian-Romanian document will soon be followed by the adoption of a treaty to be concluded with Yugoslavia. The UVM supports the settlement of Yugoslav-Hungarian ties, but reconfirmation of the Trianon borders is first and foremost in Yugoslavia's interest, he said.

The UVM expects the Hungarian government to consult the Vojvodina Hungarians on treaty developments.

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